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  INTRODUCTION   
Getting resources or entitlements into the right hands—
those in which their highest value can be realized—can be cost-
ly.1 The economic analysis of law is founded on this fact. Were 
it otherwise, there would be no need to concern ourselves with 
the efficiency of legal rules and institutions because costless 
transactions would set everything right in the blink of an eye.2 
Yet law and economics has neglected a feature of reality that is 
no less foundational than that of positive transaction costs: the 
large and variable costs associated with the political impedi-
ments that must be surmounted to achieve welfare-maximizing 
                                                                                       
 1. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960).  
 2. See id. at 8; see also R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE 
LAW 14–15 (1988). If transaction costs were zero, legal rules could be selected 
based exclusively on distributive concerns—a point Stewart Schwab has 
dubbed “The Distributive Corollary of the Coase Theorem.” Stewart Schwab, 
Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 MICH. 
L. REV. 1171, 1195 (1989). Similar observations appear in James E. Krier & 
Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in An-
other Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 448 (1995); Zachary Liscow, Reducing Ine-
quality on the Cheap, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2500–01 (2014); Michael J. Meurer, 
Fair Division, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 943 (1999). 
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distributive results.3 We argue that these political action costs4 
are significant, that they vary in knowable ways among types 
and methods of redistribution, and that perceptions of fairness, 
among other things, play a role in their magnitude.5 Because 
both efficiency and distribution matter to welfare, the two im-
pediments to its maximization—transaction costs and political 
action costs—should be treated in parallel fashion.6  
Taking political action costs into account upends the now-
conventional assumption that tax-and-transfer will always 
trump redistribution through other means. Because distribu-
tive outcomes can vary depending on the distributive route se-
lected, welfarists cannot ignore maldistributions when evaluat-
ing legal rules.7 Law and economics should attend not only to 
inefficiencies but also to distributive deficits—the degree to 
which a given distribution fails to maximize welfare for a given 
total quantity of wealth. Systematic neglect of these distribu-
tive shortfalls has led to a scholarly deficit in the economic 
analysis of law.  
Consider a standard example in which a court must decide 
whether to allow a factory to pollute to the detriment of nearby 
neighbors. The efficiency case for assigning the pollution enti-
                                                                                       
 3. We use the shorthand “welfare-maximizing” to refer to maximization 
based on whatever social welfare function has been specified, which might 
mean maximizing the sum or product of all individual utilities, the utilities of 
the least well-off, or something different.  
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 92–96 (providing a taxonomy of 
these costs). These costs are distinct from the technical or administrative chal-
lenges involved in adjusting distribution, such as the costs of assessing or col-
lecting taxes. For a discussion of administrative costs, see infra note 31.  
 5. We are not the first to note the potential implications of political costs 
for law and economics. See, e.g., Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and 
Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Articles Are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 511, 556–57, 597–601 (2005); Brett H. McDonnell, The Economists’ New 
Arguments, 88 MINN. L. REV. 86, 111 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to 
Pay vs. Welfare, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 314–15 (2007). However, the 
role of political impediments that might apply differentially to different modes 
of redistribution has been widely underappreciated.  
 6. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective 
Product: A Buyer’s Guide to Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 1655, 1665–69, 1676–81 (1974) (critiquing Posner’s focus on the falsity of 
the zero transaction cost assumption to the exclusion of other artificial as-
sumptions, including costless redistribution). Although Polinsky focuses on the 
distortive effects of taxes rather than their political costs, his critique empha-
sizes, as we do here, the importance of treating all impediments to welfare 
maximization in like fashion.  
 7. Except as otherwise specified, we will use the term “legal rules” in this 
Article to refer to non-tax legal rules and policies, whether enacted by legisla-
tive or administrative bodies or adopted by courts.  
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tlement to the party who values it most highly is premised on 
the fact that rearranging the entitlement post-judgment (which 
would require a private transaction) could be prohibitively cost-
ly. Yet little attention is given to the fact that reordering dis-
tribution post-judgment (which would require a political act) 
may also be prohibitively costly.8 If the political acts required to 
achieve a desired distributive result were understood to be cost-
ly while the transactions required to achieve a desired alloca-
tive result were deemed to be trivial, the standard prescription 
would flip: now addressing distribution would become the prior-
ity, and efficiency the afterthought. In fact, both sets of costs 
are significant, both matter to welfare, and neither can be de-
fensibly ignored.  
If we pay as much attention to political action costs as we 
do to private transaction costs, we will end up questioning an 
important tenet of conventional economic wisdom. Suppose a 
court facing the factory dispute above finds that distrib- 
utive and efficiency considerations point in opposite directions.9 
Should the court weigh the efficiency effect on welfare against 
the distributional effect on welfare—for example, choose a 
slightly less efficient rule that will avoid generating large dis-
tributive deficits? Conventional law and economics says no: the 
judge should decide the rule solely on grounds of efficiency and 
leave distribution to the tax-and-transfer system, because do-
ing so will generate fewer behavioral distortions.10  
On this view, any distributive deficit associated with the 
court’s ruling can be better addressed through the tax system. 
                                                                                       
 8. The primary cost associated with redistribution that receives atten-
tion from legal economists is the labor-leisure distortion. But because this is 
thought to be common to all distributive efforts, including those built into le-
gal rules, it is not viewed as uniquely attaching to the redistributive effort 
contemplated in the text. Administrative costs are also understood to exist but 
are given limited attention on the supposition that they will be lower for tax-
and-transfer than for doctrinal methods of redistribution. See infra note 31.  
 9. Although we focus on a court for purposes of this simple illustration, 
the same point applies to any other institutional actor who is faced with a 
choice about whether to take distributive considerations into account in formu-
lating substantive (non-tax) legal rules. There may well be institutional rea-
sons to prefer one actor over another for certain kinds of decisionmaking, but 
those considerations are orthogonal to the question that is at the heart of our 
analysis here: whether law and economics should remove distributive consid-
erations from the evaluation of all substantive legal rules. 
 10. In brief, the labor-leisure distortion is thought to attend all redistribu-
tive efforts, while inefficient redistributive legal rules additionally distort be-
havior in the domain to which the rule applies. See infra notes 25–29 and ac-
companying text.  
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For this to always be the case, however, it is not enough to 
show that tax-and-transfer minimizes the behavioral distor-
tions associated with redistribution;11 instead, tax-and-transfer 
must perform better overall at achieving distributive shifts, 
after the political action costs of achieving the desired distribu-
tive changes are taken into account. It is plausible that the 
presence of political action costs would necessitate second-best 
methods of governmental redistribution, 12  just as positive 
transaction costs will cause private parties to adopt second-best 
contracts when transaction costs block the first-best. “Political 
failure,” no less than “market failure,” can thwart efforts at 
welfare maximization. 
Omitting political failure from the analysis requires accept-
ing a crucial but rarely articulated claim that we term “the in-
variance hypothesis”: that any political failure that exists for 
tax-and-transfer must inevitably plague non-tax methods of 
distribution to at least the same degree—whether because the 
other legal actors are themselves subject to the same political 
constraints, or because their distributive efforts will be offset 
by the legislature. If this were true, political failure would 
make any shortfalls in redistribution inevitable regardless of 
what distributive methods were employed, so we would still do 
best to leave redistribution to tax-and-transfer (however inade-
quately it might accomplish the task). But, as we will show, the 
invariance hypothesis is not true.  
This Article makes three claims, corresponding to its three 
Parts. In Part I, we show that law and economic analysis em-
beds a distributive invariance hypothesis that the same dis-
tributive result will be achieved regardless of how legal rules 
are configured or how entitlements to resources are assigned.13 
                                                                                       
 11. See infra Part I.A (discussing the principle of tax superiority and the 
“extra distortion” argument).  
 12. See, e.g., Liscow, supra note 2, at 2508 (“[I]f transfers are unavailable 
in practice, their theoretical availability is irrelevant; as a result, the legal 
rule should adopt the second-best policy of taking equity directly into account 
. . . .”); see also MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 144–45 (2006) (suggesting that an administrative 
agency might at times be able to improve “overall well-being” through atten-
tion to distributive impacts where tax-and-transfer will not occur, and observ-
ing that “if this result is welfare inferior to an alternative that is politically 
impossible, that is irrelevant”). Although any tax system based on income is 
already firmly in the realm of the second-best, the claim of tax superiority 
assumes a first-best political situation, by ignoring the real-world political 
resistance to the income tax.  
 13. This hypothesis sometimes appears in the literature as a modeling 
assumption that is understood to possibly or definitely depart from reality; at 
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This invariance hypothesis rests in turn on an unstated as-
sumption that political action costs for tax adjustments are 
equal to or less than for any other method of distributing the 
same quantum of income.  
In Part II, we argue that the invariance hypothesis is false. 
Political action costs for redistribution are not only frequently 
large, they also vary dramatically among contexts for a variety 
of reasons—including political inertia, interest group politics, 
framing, and real or perceived conformity with background no-
tions of fairness. As a result, legal rules may be able to achieve 
and maintain distributive results that tax-and-transfer cannot. 
By the same token, choosing efficient legal rules over less effi-
cient ones may introduce unwanted distributive side effects 
that tax-and-transfer cannot or will not correct.  
In Part III, we argue that attending to political action costs 
leads to different conclusions about how welfarists should ap-
proach the task of designing legal rules and institutions than 
those that are currently dominant in law and economics. Wel-
farists working in law and economics should give the role of 
political action costs in sustaining distributive deficits atten-
tion on a par with that already given to the role of transaction 
costs in impeding efficient results. There should be broad 
recognition within law and economics of the falsity of the invar-
iance hypothesis and the associated possibility that legal rules 
can have durable, welfare-relevant distributive consequences. 
Legal rules are thus not axiomatically inferior to tax-and-
transfer as a means of achieving or maintaining desired dis-
tributive results—though they may be so in many domains as 
an empirical matter.  
Our project’s significance goes beyond adding to the debate 
over the best way to redistribute, however. It also focuses at-
tention on the phenomenon of distributive variance, or multiple 
distributive equilibria, within a political system. Not only does 
this phenomenon warrant study as a positive matter, it also 
raises interesting normative questions for welfarists. A desire 
to glean the benefits of a less distortionary (or otherwise pre-
ferred) redistributive method should spur interest in mecha-
nisms for addressing distributive variance—such as rules or 
policies that would make doctrinal choices with distributive 
implications conditional on corresponding tax adjustments.14  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
other times, it is cast as an empirical claim about the way distributive results 
are actually accomplished. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. See infra Part III.C.3. For example, a shift to congestion pricing of 
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I.  IDENTIFYING THE INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS   
The hypothesis of distributive invariance that we identify 
here plays an important but underappreciated logical role in 
supporting what has become the conventional wisdom about 
distributive matters. The standard advice—to ignore distribu-
tion in choosing and formulating legal rules—holds only if it is 
true that society will always end up in the same distributive 
place regardless of the redistributive methods or mechanisms 
selected. This assumption of a single distributive equilibrium 
requires, in turn, strong assumptions about the costs of politi-
cal action in the distributive realm.  
To see where the invariance hypothesis fits into the con-
ventional analysis, it is first necessary to distinguish between 
two claims about the relative desirability of redistributing 
through tax-and-transfer, both of which have been associated 
with the work of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell (K&S).15 
The first, which we do not take issue with here, is their formal 
result that for any increment of redistribution that a society 
might wish to achieve, the tax-and-transfer system can achieve 
it at a lower cost in behavioral distortion than can a legal 
rule.16 An implication of this result is that if both methods of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
road use might be made conditional on the tax system adjusting its progressiv-
ity to preserve distributive neutrality.  
 15. Kaplow and Shavell develop these ideas in both joint and solo work. 
The primary articles in this vein are Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should 
Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income 
Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821 (2000) [hereinafter 
Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the 
Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient]; 
Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rule-
making: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxa-
tion?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 414 (1981); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of 
Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513 
(1996) [hereinafter Kaplow, Public Goods]. For the related public finance liter-
ature on commodity taxation, see A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of 
Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55 (1976); 
Emmanuel Saez, The Desirability of Commodity Taxation Under Non-Linear 
Income Taxation and Heterogeneous Tastes, 83 J. PUB. ECON. 217 (2002). Alt-
hough we will focus on K&S for convenience, because their position has be-
come mainstream among law and economics scholars, we take ourselves to be 
critiquing the approach as a whole and not just these scholars in particular. 
 16. See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 669 (“[G]iven 
any regime with an inefficient legal rule (notably, one intended to help achieve 
a redistributive goal), there exists an alternative regime with an efficient legal 
rule and a modified income tax system in which all individuals are better 
off.”); see also id. at 677–81 app.; Shavell, supra note 15, at 416. This is not to 
say that we necessarily agree with the claim of formal tax superiority in all 
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redistribution are equally available and all else is equal, the 
tax-and-transfer method of redistribution is superior. We refer 
to this result as the principle of formal tax superiority.  
The second claim, which we term prescriptive tax superiori-
ty, moves from the formal result to this policy prescription: ig-
nore distributive considerations except when setting tax-and-
transfer policy.17 As we shall demonstrate, the leap from formal 
tax superiority to prescriptive tax superiority cannot be made 
without the logical step provided by the invariance hypothesis. 
For it to always be the case that formal tax superiority implies 
prescriptive tax superiority, it must also be the case that there 
are no distributive outcomes that are uniquely achievable 
through non-tax means—in other words, that one will never be 
able to improve the distributive result under real-world politi-
cal conditions by shifting to a different mode of distribution.  
We begin by describing both formal tax superiority and 
prescriptive tax superiority. We then show how prescriptive tax 
superiority assumes invariance.  
A. TWO PRINCIPLES OF TAX SUPERIORITY 
Kaplow and Shavell famously argue that tax18 is strictly 
superior to legal doctrine as a means of redistributing income.19 
They were not the first to make this claim, but they very co-
gently developed and defended the idea in a series of articles 
now well known within law and economics. As suggested al-
ready, the assertion of tax superiority comprises not one claim 
but rather two distinct claims, with very different implications. 
K&S’s formal result is the superiority, in principle, of tax as a 
means of distribution, i.e., that it is possible to achieve any giv-
en distributive outcome more cheaply, in terms of behavioral 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
respects, only that we are taking it as true for purposes of this Article.  
 17. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 677 (“This 
[extra distortion] argument, along with others that are more familiar, suggests 
that it is appropriate for economic analysis of legal rules to focus on efficiency 
and to ignore the distribution of income in offering normative judgments.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 18. We use the term “tax” in this Article interchangeably with “tax-and-
transfer” to encompass transfer payments.  
 19. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15. K&S do 
qualify this claim in some respects. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, supra note 
15, at 821, 825–34. For the most part, these qualifications are highly technical 
and not relevant to the discussion here. K&S’s treatment of the issue at the 
heart of our analysis—the possibility that distribution may be changed by 
other legal actors in a way that Congress does not offset—is detailed exten-
sively below. See infra Part I.C.  
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distortions, through tax than through legal doctrine. Distinct 
from this point is the categorical policy advice that has become 
associated with their work: that outside of tax, welfarists 
should ignore the distributive consequences of legal rules.20 It 
is this policy advice—prescriptive tax superiority—that we take 
issue with here.21  
The advice to ignore distribution in formulating legal rules 
is strikingly counterintuitive and provocative because (however 
surprising to some non-economic theorists) welfare economics 
places great significance on distribution.22 Distribution matters 
to welfare maximization in potentially two ways. First, distri-
bution of wealth or other resources can affect individual wel-
fare for a variety of reasons. The most general point is the de-
clining marginal utility of money, which means that moving a 
dollar from the rich to the poor will typically increase the wel-
fare of the poor more than it diminishes the welfare of the 
rich.23 Second, social welfare functions may aggregate individ-
                                                                                       
 20. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 677.  
 21. We believe it is a fair reading of K&S’s work to attribute to them at 
least a qualified claim of prescriptive tax superiority (and not just formal tax 
superiority), as explained below. But nothing in our argument depends on 
proving that they actually hold this view. Our point instead is to show that 
prescriptive tax superiority is, on the merits, an untenable position for law 
and economics to take, given its reliance on the invariance hypothesis.  
 22. The maximization of welfare or well-being, which is generally quite 
sensitive to distribution, must be distinguished from the maximization of 
wealth, which is not. Although wealth maximization was for a time famously 
advocated by Richard Posner, he subsequently stepped away from that view, 
and our sense is that few scholars align themselves with that approach today. 
See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1985) (offering a qualified defense of wealth maximi-
zation); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 98–101 (2001) 
(identifying “the dependence of market outcomes on the distribution of wealth” 
as the primary flaw in wealth maximization); see also Jedediah Purdy, People 
as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Ap-
proach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1052–53 n.7 (2007) (“Posner’s attempt 
to vindicate wealth-maximization as a theory of justice has not found much 
success, and Posner himself has abandoned it . . . .”). Although wealth maxi-
mization (i.e., efficiency) certainly continues to inform the analysis of substan-
tive law, see Purdy, supra, most law and economics scholars envision combin-
ing that approach with redistribution through the tax-and-transfer system to 
pursue the ultimate maximand of welfare.   
 23. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WEL-
FARE 30 (2002). There are numerous other channels through which distribu-
tion might influence utility, including crime and unrest, although the evidence 
is often mixed on these effects. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Economic Costs 
of Inequality, 2010 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23 (2010) (discussing contested empirical 
and theoretical literature finding that inequality increases crime and con-
strains economic growth); Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic 
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ual welfare in a manner that makes the distribution of utility 
or well-being itself relevant. One may plausibly choose a non-
utilitarian social welfare function that gives some weight to the 
greater equality of welfare.24 K&S dispute neither point. Their 
argument is one of means rather than ends: given the end of 
increasing (or decreasing) income equality, the best means is 
tax. 
When K&S first jointly proposed the distributional superi-
ority of tax in 1994, they could plausibly state that they were 
writing against the conventional wisdom of lawyers and law 
professors: that legal doctrine offered a superior means of re-
distributing because it avoided the distortion of labor-leisure 
decisions.25 K&S argued that this line of reasoning was errone-
ous: if doctrinal rules operate like a tax by redistributing 
wealth from the rich to the poor, people will notice themselves 
earning a lower return on their labor as their income rises, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 23 (1987) (“[A] good deal of compelled 
redistribution of wealth may be the cheapest method of preserving social peace 
and so may be cost-justified; plausible examples are pro-union legislation de-
signed to head off labor violence, [and] generous welfare allotments designed 
to head off riots in the slums . . . .”); see also Emily Underwood, Can Dispari-
ties Be Deadly? Controversial Research Explores Whether Living in an Unequal 
Society Can Make People Sick, 344 SCIENCE 829 (May 2014), http:// 
www.fammed.wisc.edu/applications/chpp/documents/publications/Population 
Health/Underwood_Can%20Disparities%20be%20Deadly.pdf (examining con-
tested evidence that widespread inequality causes a variety of negative health 
effects); Lee Anne Fennell, Interdependence and Choice in Distributive Justice: 
The Welfare Conundrum, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 235, 267–74 (discussing various 
costs poverty imposes on society, including inefficiencies associated with une-
qual opportunities, aesthetic disutility, and costs arising from interdependent 
utility functions); Juan José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez, Realistic Standards: 
Optimal Negligence Rule Under Limited Liability, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 577, 
589–90 (2008) (observing that downward adjustments in first-best due care 
levels are required for optimal deterrence when those in the relevant popula-
tion lack assets sufficient to cover the potential harm). See generally RICHARD 
WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY 
MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2009) (presenting comparative data on the costs 
of inequality in multiple domains).  
 24. A utilitarian social welfare function seeks to maximize the sum of 
individual welfare levels, but plausible alternatives involve more complex 
functions, such as maximizing the sum of the square roots of individual wel-
fare levels, which would have the effect of valuing equality of welfare.  
 25. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Sim-
ple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 
1084–85 (1980) (suggesting that a remedial choice might be a less expensive 
way to redistribute, and observing that “[d]ue to the substantial distortions in 
work effort, redistribution through the tax system would be quite costly in 
terms of efficiency”). 
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the same labor-leisure distortion will occur.26 If both tax and 
legal doctrine distort the labor-leisure decision to the same de-
gree, tax then has the advantage of avoiding the additional dis-
tortion created by any deviation from efficient legal rules.27 
Notwithstanding some cogent rejoinders to this extra distortion 
argument,28 we accept it as accurate for purposes of our discus-
sion here; our arguments apply whether it is true or false.29 
Our analysis focuses on the move from the extra distortion 
argument to the policy recommendation that, even though dis-
tribution matters to social welfare, legal doctrine should focus 
exclusively on efficiency.30 This claim of prescriptive tax supe-
riority assumes distributive invariance (as we show below), or 
equivalently, that there are no other costs in the picture that 
                                                                                       
 26. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 667–68. 
This equivalence has been disputed. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Eco-
nomic Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998) 
(arguing that legal rules may be less distortive due to cognitive biases); see 
also Liscow, supra note 2 (arguing that distortions to labor-leisure can be 
avoided or mitigated by applying rules that distribute entitlements based on 
group membership that correlates with income levels rather than on individu-
al income levels); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as In-
struments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 800 
(2000) (arguing that the extra distortion argument does not apply to “income-
independent, equity-motivated deviations from efficient legal standards”).  
 27. This argument is undermined to the extent that real-world tax-and-
transfer systems embed design choices that can add distortions beyond labor-
leisure, including choices about family composition and residential location. 
These potential distortions have, of course, been staples of discussions about 
transfers to low-income people for decades. For a recent discussion, see Scott 
Sumner, Guaranteed Annual Income: Let’s Talk Numbers, THEMONEYILLU-
SION (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p= 27639. As K&S 
recognize, the matter is also more complex than simply counting the number 
of distortions, because one distortion might offset rather than add to another 
distortion. Thus, for example, a behavioral distortion that led someone to con-
sume less of a good that is strongly complementary to leisure might offset ra-
ther than add to the labor-leisure distortion. Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, 
supra note 15, at 825–26.  
 28. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 26; Liscow, supra note 2; Markovits, supra 
note 5; Sanchirico, supra note 26. 
 29. It should be noted that K&S’s “extra distortion” (or “double distor-
tion”) argument represents an intuitive expression of formal tax superiority 
that differs from, and is less qualified than, K&S’s formal model. The differ-
ence between these two ways of expressing formal tax superiority does not 
matter for our purposes, however. Our quarrel here is not with formal tax 
superiority at all, but rather with the claim that redistribution can always be 
achieved to the same degree through tax alone. We thank Chris Sanchirico for 
discussions on this point.  
 30. See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 677.  
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might vary in a way that would favor a non-tax method of dis-
tribution.31  
Our sense today is that both the K&S result and the policy 
advice have become the conventional wisdom, at least among 
many law professors who employ economic analysis.32 Both the 
                                                                                       
 31. Administrative costs receive some attention from K&S. Id. at 675 n.12 
(“[A]lthough we did not consider the possible additional administrative costs of 
increasing the amount of redistribution through the income tax, it seems plau-
sible that these costs would be less than those of achieving significant, well-
targeted redistribution through legal rules.”); Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, 
supra note 15, at 834 n.30 (“Nor do we address administrative costs, which 
would seem to be an important factor that weighs against using legal rules to 
attempt to redistribute significant amounts of income.”); see also Markovits, 
supra note 5, at 608–10 (discussing and critiquing K&S’s neglect of this topic). 
A somewhat longer discussion of administrative costs appears in STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 656–67 (2004) (ac-
knowledging that administrative costs of the tax system are nontrivial and 
suggesting that the costs of legal rules blend together high administrative cost 
elements such as litigation with low administrative cost elements like influ-
encing behavior via deterrence). Because our primary focus in this Article is 
on political action costs, we do not focus on administrative costs but note only 
that they represent another reason for doubt about the unqualified claim of 
tax superiority. See Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of 
Redistributive Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 
25 VA. TAX REV. 1, 11–14 (2005) (arguing that administrative costs might fa-
vor redistributing through non-tax rules); David Gamage, How Should Gov-
ernments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Opti-
mal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1 (2014) (discussing the severe 
problem of tax-avoidance behavior and the possible advantages of redistribu-
tive legal rules in being more difficult to “game”). See generally Walter Perrin 
Heller & Karl Shell, On Optimal Taxation with Costly Administration, 64 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 338 (1974). 
 32. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 112 
(3d ed. 2000) (presenting administrative and extra-distortion arguments for 
preferring progressive income taxation over redistributive assignment of prop-
erty rights and concluding that “economists who favor redistribution and 
economists who oppose it can agree that property law is usually the wrong 
way to pursue distributive justice”); Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the 
Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution: A Response to 
Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2004) (describing “a view 
[among economists] that has become the new conventional wisdom: that in-
come (or wealth) redistribution is always better accomplished through the tax-
and-transfer system than through the legal system”); Blumkin & Margalioth, 
supra note 31, at 2 (noting that the K&S stance on tax superiority “seems to be 
the prevailing norm in the law and economics literature”); Liscow, supra note 
2, at 2480 (“Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis supports what is perhaps the cen-
tral tenet of law and economics, namely that legal rules should be designed 
based on their efficiency consequences.”); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Re-
distributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. 
REV. 157, 158 (2003) (“[W]e believe it is a safe bet that a majority of legal 
economists hold the following view: Whatever amount of redistribution is 
deemed appropriate or desirable, the exclusive policy tool for redistributing to 
reduce income or wealth inequality should always be the tax-and-transfer 
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formal and prescriptive claims of tax superiority have been the 
subject of numerous critiques.33 However, to our knowledge, 
our Article is the first to address head-on the crucial logical 
link of distributive invariance that connects the formal and 
prescriptive versions of tax superiority.  
It is useful to briefly consider how K&S’s extra distortion 
argument for tax superiority fits into other arguments against 
using non-tax legal doctrine to redistribute income. First, legal 
rules may actually fail to affect distribution in the desired di-
rection due to private-party adjustments along other dimen-
sions. For example, a living wage or rent control law may not 
help the poor, if employers or landlords can adjust other terms 
of the employment or landlord-tenant bargain.34 This is the fu-
tility or “contracting around” objection.35 Second, redistributive 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
system.”); Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An 
Essay for Tom Merrill, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 66 (2014) 
(“[M]ost law-and-economics scholars . . . conclude that distributive goals are 
better pursued by means of broad tax and welfare programs than by the intro-
duction of distributive considerations into the rules for resolving ordinary pri-
vate law disputes.” (footnotes omitted)). It is not only those within law and 
economics but also those standing outside of it who view the K&S prescription 
as central to law and economics. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-
Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PAL-
GRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 468 (Peter Newman ed., 
1998) (presenting tenets of the “mainstream” law and economics approach, 
which include having courts pursue efficiency and leaving distribution to the 
legislature through tax-and-transfer).  
 33. E.g., Avraham et al., supra note 32; Blumkin & Margalioth, supra 
note 31; Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Exploring the Shavellian Boundary: Vio-
lations from Judgment-Proofing, Minority Rights, and Signaling, 3 J.L. ECON. 
& POL’Y 47–62 (2006); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution 
Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326 (2006); Liscow, supra note 2; 
Markovits, supra note 5; Noah Popp, Wealth Versus Welfare: Correcting for the 
Marginal Utility of Wealth in Assigning Private Law Entitlements, 30 QUIN-
NIPIAC L. REV. 69 (2011); Sanchirico, supra note 26; Chris William Sanchirico, 
Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001) 
[hereinafter Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale].  
 34. See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 
741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., concurring) (“Landlords will try to offset the 
higher cost [associated with Chicago’s landlord-tenant ordinance] by raising 
rents.”). A related point is that poor people may be harmed by behavioral dis-
tortions produced by such legal rules, if, for example, fewer jobs or apartments 
are made available by employers or landlords—although the empirical evi-
dence on such issues is often unclear. See, e.g., Liscow, supra note 2, at 2498 
n.46 (noting mixed empirical and theoretical findings on the extent to which 
the minimum wage reduces employment or manages to redistribute).  
 35. See, e.g., David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used To Redis-
tribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 448–49 (2003); see also Original Great 
Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 
282 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“The idea that favoring one side or the other 
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legal rules not precisely tied to income can only roughly redis-
tribute in the desired direction—say, from rich to poor—while 
sometimes pushing money in the wrong direction. This problem 
of “leakage” is one facet of what is sometimes termed “the hap-
hazardness objection” to redistributive legal rules.36 Another 
facet of that objection goes to the underinclusiveness of at-
tempting to redistribute through rules that will only directly 
impact a small subset of people in a given income bracket—
those who happen, for example, to suffer injury at the hands of 
a tortfeasor. 
These arguments depend on deeply contextual inquiries. 
Not all doctrinal efforts to redistribute are futile.37 Arguments 
premised on underinclusiveness may fail to take into account 
the way that legal rules shape conduct and expectations outside 
the courtroom.38 And overinclusiveness is neither unique to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
in a class of contract disputes can redistribute wealth is one of the most per-
sistent illusions of judicial power.”). However, the concern that redistributive 
efforts will be wholly or partially undone by market adjustments is not unique 
to legal rules. See Liscow, supra note 2, at 2497–500 (discussing the potential 
incidence-shifting effects of redistributive efforts undertaken through tax as 
well as through legal rules, and citing research indicating that the Earned 
Income Tax Credit depresses wages by pushing more workers into the work 
force, thus diluting the redistributive effect).  
 36. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 35, at 449 (referring to problems of 
both underinclusion and overinclusion as “the haphazardness problem”); cf. 
David A. Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare 
Economics Meets Organizational Design, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 170–71 
(2015) [hereinafter Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis] 
(observing that redistribution through agency action will reach only those 
markets that happen to be subject to agency regulation). 
 37. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 35, at 449 (noting theoretical and em-
pirical difficulty of determining effects of legal rules and concluding “that some 
probably help their intended beneficiaries, and some probably do not”). If re-
distribution through legal rules were always illusory, there would be no need 
to consider K&S’s extra-distortion argument, nor our discussion in this paper 
of political action costs. Redistributive legal rules, like unicorns, would be 
wholly imaginary phenomena. But no one, including K&S, thinks it is literally 
impossible for any redistribution to occur through legal rules or doctrines out-
side of tax law. 
 38. Legal rules may operate to the benefit or detriment of income classes 
through deterrence effects, even if relatively few members of those income 
classes wind up in court. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 32, at 185–86. For 
example, making tort recovery sensitive to actual lost income might be ex-
pected to yield less careful driving in low-income neighborhoods or less careful 
treatment of low-income patients, whereas averaging income would tend to 
equalize the deterrence effects across income classes. See Ariel Porat, Misa-
lignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 97–99 (2011). It is also unclear that 
redistribution through private law as a whole, which includes contract and 
property doctrines as well as tort law, would be any less inclusive than redis-
tribution through tax law. Sanchirico, Efficiency Rationale, supra note 33, at 
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doctrinal redistribution39 nor always without its countervailing 
virtues.40 As a result, neither contracting around nor haphaz-
ardness provides a universal argument for tax superiority. This 
is where K&S’s extra-distortion argument comes in to (ostensi-
bly) deal the knock-out punch, providing an across-the-board 
reason to disfavor redistributive legal rules.41  
The idea that distributive changes are always best pursued 
through the tax system thus supports a strict division of labor 
in which those charged with formulating legal rules use effi-
ciency as their maximand.42 This is, at any rate, the conven-
tional understanding of K&S’s proof.43 
We wish to illustrate how the policy advice works in prac-
tice. Consider first some examples44 from the work of courts:  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1052. Finally, even within tort law, redistribution is made more comprehen-
sive through insurance, which “transmutes the haphazard into the definite.” 
Id.; see also Logue & Avraham, supra note 32, at 186–88.    
 39. In fact, tax law itself (as it exists on the ground) is riddled with excep-
tions and examples of poor targeting. See Weisbach, supra note 35, at 452 (ob-
serving that the tax system is “riven with loopholes” but suggesting legal rules 
would be no better and “could easily be much worse”); see also Gamage, supra 
note 31 (examining the implications of “tax gaming”). There are also important 
debates about whether income offers a sufficiently good measurement of well-
being to serve as the basis for targeting in the first place. See Sanchirico, su-
pra note 26; see also Liscow, supra note 2, at 2502–09 (suggesting that some 
redistributive efforts may be better targeted based on some non-income meas-
ure of desert or need, rather than income). 
 40. See, e.g., infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text (noting potential 
political advantages of imperfect targeting or “leakage”). 
 41. See, e.g., Avraham et al., supra note 32, at 1127 (“Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell made what seemed to be a decisive argument regarding the 
use of redistributive legal rules. They argued that income redistribution is 
always more efficiently accomplished through the tax-and-transfer system, 
even if the contracting-around and haphazardness issues are placed aside.”). 
 42. This division of labor tracks the First and Second Fundamental Theo-
rems of Welfare Economics, as well as the more prosaic admonition to separate 
pie maximization from pie slicing. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, A New Un-
derstanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 817 n.21 (2005) (referencing “the 
argument of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, tracking the two welfare theo-
rems, that the general legal system should be evaluated vis-à-vis the goal of 
welfare maximization or allocative efficiency, leaving the tax system to redis-
tribute wealth”); Meurer, supra note 2, at 941–42 n.28 (1999) (explaining how 
law and economics “bifurcates efficiency and fairness analysis of the law” and 
describing the “usual attitude . . . that law should be shaped by efficiency con-
cerns, and [that] the legislature can achieve fairness through taxation and 
spending policies”); see also A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (4th ed. 2011) (“[E]fficiency corresponds to ‘the size of 
the pie,’ while equity has to do with how it is sliced.”). 
 43. We say this with some confidence, having reviewed scores of citations 
to K&S on this point appearing in articles published from 2005 through 2013.  
 44. The examples provided here and elsewhere in the Article are offered 
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  Tort Recovery. A judge is deciding whether to award 
damages for lost income based on the particular plain-
tiff’s actual expected income (the tailored rule) or based 
on the average expected income of people in the same 
age cohort living in the community (the untailored rule). 
The tailored rule (which is standard practice) would fa-
vor higher income people over lower income people, 
while the latter would have the opposite effect.45 The 
tailored rule arguably carries an efficiency advantage in 
settings where the income levels of the potential victims 
are known to the potential injurer.46  
 
  Arbitration Clause. An appellate court is deciding 
whether to enforce or invalidate an arbitration clause in 
a standardized consumer contract. Perhaps enforcing 
the clause redistributes away from the rich consumers 
(who value more highly the right to sue in court) and 
toward low and middle income consumers (who value a 
cheaper product and a cheaper process).47 Or perhaps 
the opposite is true, because invalidating the arbitration 
clause preserves the right to bring class action suits, 
and this would benefit lower income people.48 Arbitra-
                                                                                                                                                                                         
for purposes of concreteness, not to defend strong claims about the distributive 
or efficiency consequences at play in any of these particular scenarios.  
 45. See, e.g., TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBU-
TIVE JUSTICE 51–52, 67–69 (2007) (noting distributive effects of restitutio ad 
integrum, which provides for tailored compensation). Similarly, administrative 
agencies must decide whether, in cost-benefit analysis, to use a single measure 
of the value of a statistical life or whether to adjust the value depending on the 
expected income of the lives saved. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra note 12, 
at 181–82.  
 46. This efficiency advantage is contested and depends on a number of 
further assumptions. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudi-
cation: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 312–16 (1994) (main-
taining that setting damages equal to actual harm, rather than average harm, 
will improve incentives where people can anticipate actual harm levels but 
emphasizing that this added accuracy may not be worth its cost); Porat, supra 
note 38, at 100–05 (discussing the efficiency implications of tailored and untai-
lored tort damage rules and rejecting the arguments for placing less value on 
the “lives and limbs” of lower-income people); see also Ronen Avraham, Is 
Race- and Sex-Based Targeting Efficient? A Closer Look at Tort Law’s Discrim-
inatory Damage Awards (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Economics Re-
search Paper No. E558, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2646901 (examining 
the racial and gender implications of using tailored schedules to determine 
damage awards and contesting the efficiency argument for such targeting).  
 47. See Omri Ben-Shahar, Arbitration and Access to Courts: Economic 
Analysis, in REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DISPUTE RES-
OLUTION 447, 458–62 (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 2013).  
 48. The analysis here is complex. See id. at 462–65. While recoveries are 
low for class action plaintiffs, the deterrence effect might on some assumptions 
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tion is generally regarded as a more efficient method of 
dispute resolution than litigation.49 
 
In cases such as these, the principle of tax superiority sug-
gests the court should focus only on the efficiency implications 
of these decisions and ignore the distributive consequences. 
Where efficiency cuts in a different direction than distributive 
desirability (on a given social welfare function), this amounts to 
advice to choose a distributively inferior result.  
Although K&S emphasize court-made law, the implication 
of the theory is by no means limited to judicial institutions. As 
a logical matter, their policy prescription applies just as strong-
ly to the legislature, implying that it should also redistribute 
income though its tax mechanisms and no other type of law.50 
For example:  
 
  Teacher Tenure. A state legislature must decide 
whether to keep or discard a teacher tenure provision. 
Suppose the provision has the effect of increasing the 
number of school teachers at the high end of the ability 
distribution (because they value academic freedom) and 
at the low end of the ability distribution (because they 
value the ability to shirk without losing their jobs). If we 
assume that the teachers at the high end of the distribu-
tion primarily serve high income schools and those at 
the low end of the distribution primarily serve low in-
come schools, retaining the provision will distribute to-
ward the wealthy, while discarding it will distribute to-
ward the poor.51 The efficiency of the provision depends 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
benefit consumers sufficiently to make up for the more expensive product.  
 49. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitra-
tion: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of 
Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 340 (2007) (“Notwithstand-
ing [previously discussed] skeptical views, the bulk of authority seems to agree 
that arbitration is a more efficient dispute resolution procedure than litiga-
tion.”). Eisenberg and Miller call this conventional wisdom into question, how-
ever, by finding that sophisticated parties do not typically insert arbitration 
clauses into their agreements with each other—something we might expect to 
see if arbitration clauses really did generate surplus for contracting parties. 
See generally id.  
 50. Indeed, the K&S analysis would specify use of only certain kinds of 
broad-based taxes on income or wages, not merely any policy instrument that 
happens to appear in the Internal Revenue Code. Using “tax expenditures” 
like the mortgage interest deduction, for example, introduces distortions into 
housing consumption choices without alleviating labor-leisure distortions—
assuming the same revenues are collected by increasing burdens elsewhere.  
 51. Cf. Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, slip op. at 15 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
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on the aggregate effect of the provision on teacher self-
selection and performance systemwide.  
 
  Military Recruitment. Congress must decide whether 
to staff the military with volunteers or conscript by lot-
tery. Congress must also decide on military pay and 
benefits. Because volunteer forces are disproportionately 
drawn from the poor, this system of government em-
ployment tends to distribute wealth toward the poor in 
times of peace and away from the poor in times of war;52 
distribution is also affected by the level of compensation. 
An all-volunteer system, let us suppose, has the efficien-
cy advantage of being cheaper to administer.53  
 
Once again, the conventional wisdom, based on K&S, 
would urge that these non-tax legislative decisions be made 
based on their efficiency implications and not based on their 
distributive consequences.  
The same policy advice applies to the decisions of execu-
tives and administrative agencies. Consider the following:  
 
   Criminal Enforcement. The mayor of a city orders the 
police chief to move undercover drug operations from 
poor to wealthy neighborhoods and target the types of 
drugs that are more prevalent in those neighborhoods. 
The district attorney shifts from a priority of pursuing 
prostitutes to a priority of pursuing their customers. 
Both measures strongly affect the distribution of the 
costs and benefits of criminal enforcement.54 The effi-
                                                                                                                                                                                         
June 10, 2014) (striking down teacher tenure statutes as violative of the state 
constitution and noting that they “disproportionately affect poor and/or minor-
ity students”).  
 52. For discussion of the impact of army selection mechanisms on dispari-
ties in wartime casualties, see DOUGLAS L. KRINER & FRANCIS X. SHEN, THE 
CASUALTY GAP: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN WARTIME 
INEQUALITIES 58–67 (2010).  
 53. See Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, Conscription as Regulation, 
7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 85, 86 (2005) (“Relative to an all-volunteer army, where 
potential recruits show up and willingly cooperate with all procedures, con-
scription demands a substantial fixed cost on top of what is already being 
spent recruiting volunteers.”). As Mulligan and Shleifer note, the efficiency 
question has typically been viewed in terms of a tradeoff between better selec-
tion (through the volunteer force) and less need for distortionary taxation to 
fund the system (through the draft). Id. Their analysis seeks to understand 
differences among countries based on the role of conscription start-up and 
enforcement costs. See generally id.  
 54. See, e.g., Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1171 (2012). 
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ciency analysis here is contested, but if the underlying 
prohibitions are desirable, the efficient enforcement is 
plausibly whichever one diminishes the crime the most 
cost-effectively. 
 
  Environmental Regulation. Proposed administrative 
regulations aimed at protecting the environment raise 
the price of electricity in a manner that disproportion-
ately burdens poor households. Other proposed regula-
tions raise property values near polluting power facili-
ties in a manner that, on average, benefits poor 
neighborhoods.55 An efficiency analysis would consider 
only how well these regulations internalize the costs of 
electricity production. 
 
In all such cases, if the law is not tax, the advice in select-
ing a rule is to give no weight to distribution.56  
B. PRESCRIPTIVE TAX SUPERIORITY’S FOUNDATION IN  
DISTRIBUTIVE INVARIANCE 
Prescriptive tax superiority rests on a hypothesis of dis-
tributive invariance that occupies a crucial but underappreciat-
ed position within mainstream law and economics.57 Specifical-
ly, the policy advice (to ignore distribution in setting legal 
rules) requires accepting the strong assumption that the dis-
tributive pattern in a society will be invariant to the political 
                                                                                       
 55. Whether property value increases near factories would help poor peo-
ple in the area depends on whether they own their homes or rent. See ADLER 
& POSNER, supra note 12, at 143–44 (considering the possible distributive ef-
fects of an agency decision about whether to site a park in a wealthy or poor 
neighborhood). 
 56. Some law and economics scholars working in administrative law have 
been open to considering distributive considerations in addressing how (or if) 
cost-benefit analysis should be conducted. See, e.g., ADLER & POSNER, supra 
note 12, at 130–31, 142–46, 188. The distributive issue is presented bluntly in 
the cost-benefit context because the diminishing marginal utility of money 
makes the willingness to pay of the rich much greater than that of the poor. 
Equalizing welfare would require accounting for wealth differences. Although 
a tax-and-transfer system might be better in theory, its practical unavailabil-
ity changes the calculus. See id. at 144–45. For a critique of this justification 
for using distributive weights in regulatory policy, see Weisbach, Distribution-
ally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 173–78. 
 57. K&S acknowledge this assumption to some degree, and provide quali-
fications based on it, as we explain below. See infra Part I.C. However, our 
review of the literature indicates that the significance of the assumption and 
the qualifications it implies for prescriptive tax superiority have not been 
widely appreciated.  
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form of redistribution. If the courts uphold arbitration clauses 
and grant entitlements against pollution to the poor and Con-
gress replaces conscription with an all-volunteer force during 
peacetime, the resulting distributive changes will be offset by 
tax adjustments to the extent they produce divergence from the 
distributive pattern corresponding to the current political equi-
librium. Conversely, if legal rules and policies are adopted that 
operate to the detriment of the poor, Congress will again adjust 
the tax system to restore its preferred distributive pattern. 
This assumption amounts to a “law of conservation” of redistri-
bution; whatever redistribution the current political equilibri-
um allows is exactly the amount that will occur, no more and 
no less, regardless of the methods of redistribution.58  
On this account, undertaking redistribution through legal 
rules or non-tax legislation will, at best, substitute a less effi-
cient redistributive mechanism for redistribution that Congress 
would have otherwise implemented through the tax system; at 
worst, it will trigger a countervailing distributive move that 
undoes the redistribution while leaving behind the behavioral 
distortions. Redistributive legal rules or social policies that will 
inevitably either crowd out more efficient redistribution or 
draw costly countermoves cannot improve the distributive pic-
ture. If the amount of redistribution is fixed, then it is obvious 
that one should want to accomplish that redistribution in the 
most efficient way.  
Far from being a mere detail or sideline, the invariance 
hypothesis is the logical linchpin of prescriptive tax superiority. 
Importantly, K&S, along with many law and economics schol-
ars, maintain a position of distributive agnosticism; they do not 
commit themselves to any factual claims about the relationship 
between distribution and individual welfare (e.g., the rate at 
which the marginal utility of money declines). Nor do they 
                                                                                       
 58. In other words, there will be the same total amount of redistribution 
from a baseline in which all legal rules are wealth-maximizing. Using legal 
entitlements to influence distributive patterns can obviously reduce the 
amount of explicit redistribution that occurs, even if invariance is assumed. It 
is a semantic question (but not a politically unfreighted one) whether distribu-
tive choices that are “baked into” legal rules, institutional structures, and en-
titlement allocation choices should be regarded as “redistributive” (as opposed 
to just distributive) whenever they depart from those choices that would max-
imize wealth. For discussion of the relevance of baselines to the definition of 
redistribution, see Redistribution, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/redistribution (last updated June 21, 2011); see also 
LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUS-
TICE (2002). 
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commit to any particular social welfare function, but appear 
open to any welfarist approach, including ones that give weight 
to the way in which welfare is distributed.59 Thus, the categori-
cal claim of prescriptive tax superiority applies regardless of 
how heavily a given social welfare function weights the well-
being of subsets of the population.60 But universal tax superior-
ity can logically coexist with true distributive agnosticism only 
if one assumes that any distributive pattern that is politically 
achievable at all can actually be achieved through the tax sys-
tem.  
To demonstrate, let us assume the opposite, distributive 
variance, such that some distributive outcome, call it Outcome 
R, can only be achieved and maintained through resort (at least 
in part) to redistributive legal rules. If one is truly agnostic 
about distribution, then one cannot exclude the possibility that 
Outcome R maximizes overall social welfare. It follows from 
distributive agnosticism that Outcome R might dominate the 
closest politically achievable all-tax alternative, Outcome T, on 
purely distributive grounds. But true distributive agnosticism 
also implies that distributive differences can be given any 
weight whatsoever when trading them off against efficiency 
losses. A welfarist might weight distributive differences heavily 
due to the way in which a particular social welfare function ag-
                                                                                       
 59. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 27 (“[W]e do not defend any 
specific way of aggregating individuals’ well-being; that is, we do not endorse 
any particular view about the proper distribution of well-being or income.”); id. 
at 28–31 (explaining the ways in which a welfarist approach might call for 
redistribution, including the possibility that “more weight might be placed on 
the well-being of less-well-off individuals”); see also SHAVELL, supra note 31, at 
597 (observing that welfare economics encompasses “a vast multitude of ways 
of aggregating individual utilities,” including approaches in which “more equal 
distributions of utility may be superior to less equal distributions,” without 
specifying any one method). This agnosticism about distributive matters is 
sometimes couched in terms of lack of expertise. See, e.g., James J. Heckman, 
The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics Movement, 15 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 327, 329 (1997) (“Knight, Robbins, Samuelson, and all modern econo-
mists . . . explicitly state in their writings that they have no competence to 
assess the ‘appropriate’ distribution of resources and they do not sanction any 
particular distribution of resources, much less the existing one.”).  
 60. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107 (2004) 
(“[D]istributional equity under any measure of social welfare is better pursued 
through our income tax (and welfare) system than through any other social 
policy.”); see also Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 667 (ob-
serving that criticisms about the neglect of distributive issues in economic 
analysis of law “would be moot if the income tax system—understood here to 
include possible transfer payments to the poor—could be used freely to achieve 
any desired distribution of income” before discussing labor-leisure distortions 
that impede such free redistribution).  
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gregates the welfare of different people, or because of the way 
that wealth differences actually influence the welfare of indi-
viduals under particular social conditions.61 On some imagina-
ble social welfare function, then, combined with some set of 
welfare-relevant facts, the distributive gains from Outcome R 
relative to Outcome T would outweigh the efficiency ad-
vantages of Outcome T relative to Outcome R.  
Only if the invariance hypothesis is categorically true can 
we rule out the possibility of welfare-maximizing outcomes that 
are uniquely achievable through resort to non-tax methods. 
Once variance in achievable distributive results is established, 
the fact that a particular legal rule will perform better on a 
given distributive metric should receive as much attention in a 
welfarist analysis as the fact that a particular legal rule will 
perform better on the efficiency metric. If a more welfare-
enhancing distributive pattern is politically possible through a 
combination of tax and non-tax law than through tax law alone, 
we face the following trade-off: suffer the distortions associated 
with adding non-tax redistributive methods to the mix, or suf-
fer the distributive deficits associated with forgoing those 
methods. Because it is not possible to know a priori which al-
ternative will be less costly in welfare terms, the prescriptive 
claim of universal tax superiority fails. 
C.  THE EXISTING LITERATURE AND THE INVARIANCE  
HYPOTHESIS 
We will now examine how the invariance hypothesis ap-
pears in the literature, where it represents an acknowledged 
qualification on the prescriptive claim of tax superiority, but 
one whose significance has been largely neglected. Here we do 
not find one single, clearly stated proposition but rather a 
mostly unacknowledged premise revealed in scattered remarks. 
Moreover, there are at least two distinct ways that the invari-
ance hypothesis might be understood, each of which finds some 
support in the existing literature. First, it might be understood 
as an assumption underpinning prescriptive tax superiority, 
and hence as an explicit qualification on the recommendation 
that the distributive effects of legal rules be ignored. Second, it 
might be understood as a truth-claim about the world: that our 
political system in fact exhibits distributive invariance. We ar-
gue that invariance is false as a factual matter. To the extent it 
                                                                                       
 61. See supra note 23 (discussing some of the ways that wealth differences 
can influence welfare). 
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is understood as a modeling assumption, its falsity strongly 
limits the real world application of tax superiority in a way that 
has not been generally appreciated.62  
Our literature review begins with a 1979 article by Aanund 
Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser on why distributive goals 
should not influence the choice of government programs, which 
K&S repeatedly cite.63 As Shavell says in his 1981 paper, when 
noting the parallel nature of the result, “the choice of a legal 
rule may be likened to the choice of a [government] project.”64 
Interesting, then, is the way that Hylland and Zeckhauser 
qualify their policy advice. After observing that “[r]eal life” po-
litical decisions about distribution are often made in a piece-
meal fashion, contrary to their model, they explain that an un-
clear and partial relationship between these decisions could 
lead to different levels of distribution across different distribu-
tive methods and domains: 
 
[O]ur results suggest that the group [with distributional 
goals] should emphasize tax strategies, but other pro-
grams should not necessarily be neglected.  
. . . . 
. . . For example, a group which works for increased well 
being for the poor may achieve greater success by urging 
subsidies for low-income housing than by advocating 
cash grants to the same low-income groups. That is, the 
former type of support may be more acceptable to the 
higher-income people who will have to pay the subsidy.65 
 
                                                                                       
 62. An analogy can be drawn here to the way in which Robert Nozick’s 
ideas have been used to support arguments against redistribution. Nozick 
famously eschewed any “patterned” distributive goal in favor of the actual 
distributions produced under certain strong assumptions about the history of 
acquisition and transfer. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 
155–60 (1974); see also id. at 150–53 (setting out the conditions that would, 
under his approach, justify the resulting entitlements). Nozick himself noted 
the implications of these predicate conditions failing, even if his readers often 
ignored this point. Id. at 152, 230–31 (explaining that his “principle of rectifi-
cation” could call for more state intervention, potentially including approaches 
like the one endorsed by John Rawls). Similarly, to the extent K&S meant to 
present the invariance assumption as a strong qualification on their results, 
most law and economics scholars have either failed to receive that message or 
chose to ignore it.  
 63. Aanund Hylland & Richard Zeckhauser, Distributional Objectives 
Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 SCANDINAVIAN J. 
ECON. 264 (1979). 
 64. See Shavell, supra note 15, at 418. 
 65. Hylland & Zeckhauser, supra note 63, at 282. 
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Hylland and Zeckhauser go on to observe that the different 
perspectives of “goods egalitarians” and “income egalitarians” 
could alter the degree to which tax progressivity would respond 
to changes in other distributive programs.66  
This theme is also found in the work of Kaplow and 
Shavell, although it is not presented as a formal assumption of 
their model. In his 1981 article, Shavell states the qualification 
strongly:  
 
[I]f the income tax would not be altered on adoption of 
new liability rules, then in strict logic the argument giv-
en for use of efficient rules does not apply. Now, of 
course, no one would really expect the income tax struc-
ture to be adjusted in response to each and every change 
in legal rules (much less to individual changes in other 
domains), for this would be impractical. Therefore, one’s 
attitude toward the result under discussion will depend 
on his expectation that the income tax would be (or 
could be) altered in response to changes in legal rules 
whenever these changes resulted in a “sufficiently im-
portant” shift in the distribution of income.67 
 
By the time of the 1994 joint article, however, K&S present 
the qualification in a manner that suggests an empirical conjec-
ture: 
 
An argument sometimes offered in favor of redistribu-
tion through legal rules is that the tax system falls short 
of optimal redistributive taxation—perhaps because of 
the balance of political power in the legislature. This ar-
gument raises questions that we do not seek to address 
about the function of courts in a democracy. In any case, 
it seems unlikely that courts can accomplish significant 
redistribution through the legal system without attract-
ing the attention of legislators.68  
 
This passage suggests that if optimally redistributive taxes 
are politically infeasible,69 there is little prospect of welfare-
                                                                                       
 66. Id. at 283.  
 67. Shavell, supra note 15, at 417.  
 68. Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 675.  
 69. The potential infeasibility of optimally redistributive taxes has often 
been noted. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, Why (and How) 
Fairness Matters at the IP/Antitrust Interface, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1817, 1825–
26 (2003); Meurer, supra note 2, at 970 n.117; Scott Shapiro & Edward F. 
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enhancing distributive changes outside the realm of tax either. 
On this account, the very same congressional barriers to 
achieving the best distribution via tax will also impede the 
achievement of the best distribution through legal doctrine, be-
cause distributive changes will be offset.70  
Shavell makes the point more categorically in a short book 
introducing the economic analysis of law.71 There, he asks the 
question, “What if the wrong people—whoever you think they 
are—control the income tax system? Isn’t there, then, an argu-
ment for redistributing through law?” His answer:  
 
Not really. Suppose, for instance, that you want the poor 
to have more wealth, so you make it easier for them to 
bring suit and collect large judgments. But if the people 
in control of taxes don’t want the poor to get more, pre-
sumably they can just raise taxes on the poor (or reduce 
credits that the poor enjoy) so as to counter the change 
you sought to effect.72  
 
 In a later book, however, Shavell again acknowledges that 
the argument for tax superiority would not apply “[i]f  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
McClennen, Law-and-Economics from a Philosophical Perspective, in 2 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, supra note 32, at 
460, 463; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 314–15. Indeed, there is little reason to 
think that Congress consciously structures the tax system to maximize wel-
fare.  
 70. The passage also embeds an apparent normative suggestion that 
courts may be inferior institutionally to make distributive decisions. This is a 
separate point from one premised on invariance and indeed only becomes rele-
vant to the extent there is variance. See infra Part III.B.3.  
 71. SHAVELL, supra note 60, at 108 box 17. According to its preface, the 
book is drawn from a law school textbook and “is a self-contained and reader-
friendly introduction to the growing new subject known as economic analysis 
of law.” Id. at iii.  
 72. Id. Likewise, the teacher’s manual of the casebook coauthored by 
Shavell from which the book containing the quoted material was drawn in-
cludes the following: 
Suppose that someone says that those in control of the political sys-
tem, and thus of the income tax system, do not have the socially cor-
rect view of how much wealth should be redistributed toward the 
poor. Would it then make sense for [someone] to recommend taking 
distributional considerations . . . generally into account in policymak-
ing, such [as] in considering whether to place ceilings on drug prices? 
Answer. Those in control of the political system will offset attempts to 
redistribute . . . and we will wind up hurting drug co. incentives and 
not helping poor. 
HOWELL E. JACKSON, LOUIS KAPLOW, STEVEN SHAVELL, KIP VISCUSI & DAVID 
COPE, TEACHERS’ MANUAL TO ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS VI-62 
(2004) (second ellipses in original). 
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. . . the political process is imperfect not only in failing to 
achieve society’s redistributive goals, but also in failing to offset 
attempts to redistribute through the choice of legal rules.”73 
Kaplow’s separate work on distribution-neutral public policies 
provides further insight into his understanding of how tax off-
setting operates.74 In a 1996 article that focuses on the funding 
of public goods, a qualified empirical conjecture in favor of dis-
tributive invariance can be seen in this takeaway:  
 
To be sure, one would not expect tax adjustments to off-
set the benefits of new public projects completely and 
precisely. Nevertheless, if one had to guess, it seems 
plausible that roughly, on average, and over time, 
changes in the level of public goods will tend to be ac-
companied by tax adjustments that offset changes in the 
distributive incidence of the benefits produced by those 
goods.75 
 
More recently, in a paper addressing externality control, 
Kaplow queries the degree to which distribution-neutral poli-
cies could be implemented “as a practical and political matter,” 
observing that “even a legislature that desired to offset distrib-
utive effects would be unlikely to do so with precision” where a 
policy generates “intricate” distributive impacts.76 In an earlier 
footnote, however, he repeats the “conjecture” that “such re-
forms will, on average, tend to leave the preexisting political 
equilibrium regarding the extent of redistribution unaltered.”77 
                                                                                       
 73. SHAVELL, supra note 31, at 659–60.  
 74. See, e.g., Kaplow, Public Goods, supra note 15; Louis Kaplow, Optimal 
Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation, 53 INT’L ECON. 
REV. 487 (2012) [hereinafter Kaplow, Externalities]. These pieces are not cen-
tered on the normative claim that legal rules should not redistribute. Indeed, 
the 2012 Externalities piece declares itself to be “a theoretical exercise,” not a 
basis for policy. See Kaplow, Externalities, supra, at 499, 503. Rather, these 
pieces show how policies that would appear to have distributive implications 
(and, relatedly, impacts on the magnitude of the labor-leisure distortion) can 
be made distribution-neutral through countervailing adjustments in the tax 
system, altering the way in which those policies should be evaluated in the 
first instance. The common thread is the claim that the tax system is well 
suited to make the necessary distributive adjustments to produce a desired 
level of redistribution, regardless of what happens in other domains. The 2000 
joint K&S article thus characterized the 1996 Public Goods article as “a much 
more general version of the argument” from the joint 1994 paper. See Kaplow 
& Shavell, Legal Rules, supra note 15, at 824.  
 75. Kaplow, Public Goods, supra note 15, at 521.  
 76. Kaplow, Externalities, supra note 74, at 499. 
 77. Id. at 498 n.10. 
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A similar mix of claims, conjectures, and qualifications appear 
in other work.78 
As this review reveals, some articulations of invariance as-
sert that Congress will offset conscious efforts at distributive 
improvement undertaken by courts or other governmental enti-
ties, to the extent those efforts produce distributive results that 
deviate from congressional preferences. We might think of this 
as “aspirational invariance”—the claim that any effort to use 
legal rules to improve distribution (according to some metric) 
beyond the level indicated by the current political equilibrium 
will be countered by an adjustment to the tax-and-transfer sys-
tem that will return distribution to its baseline condition. In 
the examples above, the claim would be that we should not as-
pire to improve distribution by selecting a new but inefficient 
rule regarding arbitration, tort damages, teacher tenure, mili-
tary recruitment, criminal enforcement, or environmental regu-
lation, since any apparent improvement will be undone. 
But there is another facet of invariance, which we call “cor-
rective invariance,” that must also be true in order for prescrip-
tive tax superiority to hold. Corrective invariance refers to the 
claim that a legal rule or policy that worsens distribution (ac-
cording to some metric) will not have any lasting unwanted ef-
fect on distributive results because it will be corrected through 
tax-and-transfer. 79  Suppose, to maximize wealth, we would 
                                                                                       
 78. See, e.g., KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 23, at 35 n.39 (rehearsing 
invariance arguments and concluding that “it seems unlikely that judges could 
succeed in implementing a regime that was significantly more or less redis-
tributive than the one favored by the legislature”); Louis Kaplow, Discounting 
Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficien-
cy, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 79, 97 (2007) (observing, in the intergenerational con-
text, that “if one had to predict a priori the most likely long-run distributive 
impact of a policy change, distribution neutrality would be the best guess” but 
stressing that this “is merely a conjecture of what may tend to be true roughly, 
on average, and in the long run, not a precise description of any particular 
political reality”); Louis Kaplow, On the (Ir)Relevance of Distribution and La-
bor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 172–73 
(2004) (observing that “[i]f one had to speculate about how redistribution 
would ultimately tend to be affected by government projects, it seems plausi-
ble to suppose, as a first approximation, that the long-run political equilibrium 
regarding redistribution will not be affected in an obvious, predictable manner 
by this or that government action,” making distributive neutrality a useful 
construct, even though “the political process is far more complicated than 
this”); see also Yew-Kwang Ng, Quasi-Pareto Social Improvements, 74 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1033, 1040 (1984) (positing that “[e]specially in the long run, the 
forces that operate to prevent redistribution through taxation will also operate 
to prevent redistribution by other means” but noting that “actual political de-
cisions are affected by a host of factors”). 
 79. The notion of corrective invariance encompasses not just instances in 
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need to adopt a new legal rule regarding arbitration, tort dam-
ages, teacher tenure, or some other topic, and this rule will ad-
versely affect distribution. Corrective invariance counsels us to 
ignore this distributive deficit and adopt the rule because Con-
gress can and will offset the loss through a change in tax-and-
transfer. In sum, aspirational invariance holds that it is impos-
sible for courts or policymakers to make the distribution better, 
while corrective invariance holds that it is impossible for them 
to make the distribution worse.80  
These are the claims we reject. Of course, K&S do not as-
sert that invariance (of either form) is true in an absolute sense 
as an empirical matter. But however one might understand 
their position(s) on the matter, the implications for tax superi-
ority have not been generally appreciated. With a few excep-
tions,81 the received wisdom seems to accept prescriptive tax 
superiority without confronting or even raising the issue of in-
variance.82 Our goal here is to bring invariance to a position of 
prominence equal to that held by the zero transaction cost as-
sumption. As we establish below, invariance is equally false, 
and in ways that are just as policy-relevant.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
which courts or policymakers enact new rules or laws that affirmatively wors-
en distribution, but also inaction by governmental entities when economic or 
social conditions produce distributive deficits that they would be in a position 
to address. Tax superiority would assert that these deficits can always be ad-
dressed more cheaply through tax-and-transfer—assuming the political equi-
librium allows them to be addressed at all. This last point connects to the pos-
sibility that changing distributions alter the political equilibrium and change 
what it is possible to achieve distributively. See infra notes 177–79, 186 and 
accompanying text.  
 80. We are not aware of anyone previously drawing a clear distinction 
between these two facets of invariance. A focus on the aspirational flavor of 
invariance understates the impact of the distributive message associated with 
the principle of tax superiority. It is not just a matter of recommending that 
courts and policymakers leave distributive improvements to the tax system; 
tax superiority also prescribes choosing efficient legal rules and policies that 
will make distribution worse, based on the assumption that there will be an 
appropriate correction through tax. 
 81. The most extended discussion of which we are aware is found in Mar-
kovits, supra note 5. Matthew Adler and Eric Posner also appear to expressly 
recognize the possibility of variance when they observe (in a discussion of 
whether and how cost-benefit analysis should account for wealth distortions) 
that “it might be the case that welfare-improving transfers through the tax 
and welfare system are not made because Congress has other things on its 
mind, and not because the optimal distribution of wealth has been achieved.” 
ADLER & POSNER, supra note 12, at 144–45.  
 82. Our research suggests that references to K&S’s views favoring tax-
and-transfer almost never mention the point. The political infeasibility of op-
timally redistributive taxes is a not uncommon critique, but scholars do not 
often address K&S’s invariance response to that critique.  
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II.  THE INVARIANCE HYPOTHESIS IS FALSE   
So far, we have established that the claim of prescriptive 
tax superiority depends on an assumption of distributive invar-
iance. That assumption implies that the political action costs 
for tax adjustments are equal to or less than the political action 
costs of any alternative method of distributing the same quan-
tum of income. In this Part, we proceed to explain why the in-
variance hypothesis and the associated implication about polit-
ical action costs are false. We do not mean false in some trivial 
sense, but seriously, substantially wrong. (We also argue in 
Part II.B.4 that even if there were only a trivial amount of var-
iance, it would still upend the policy advice of tax superiority).  
A. FROM EMPIRICS TO THEORY 
The claim of invariance requires a system of tax and trans-
fer that is impressively responsive—capable of adjusting, and 
motivated to adjust, when legal rules alter the distributive bal-
ance. How well does this image of distributive responsiveness 
square with observed behavior? Consider first the fact that the 
tax-and-transfer system has not generally adjusted over time to 
correct for changes in the national income distribution. For ex-
ample, the ratio of the top disposable income quintile to the 
bottom disposable income quintile (i.e., the share of all post-
tax-and-transfer income received by the top 20% divided by the 
share of the bottom 20%) has changed from 5.7 in 1974 to 8.2 in 
2012, a 44% increase.83 The (post-tax-and-transfer) Gini coeffi-
cient, an overall measure of income inequality,84 has gone from 
0.316 in 1974 to 0.389 in 2012, a 23% increase, similar to the 
                                                                                       
 83. The statistics in this paragraph are drawn from Income Distribution 
and Poverty: By Country, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD. STAT., 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (last visited Nov. 24, 2015). To view these and 
other measures of income inequality on the OECD site, select the “social pro-
tection and well-being” hyperlink on the left-hand side bar; then select the 
“income distribution and poverty” hyperlink; finally select the “by country-
INEQUALITY” hyperlink. The interface can then be used to select countries, 
inequality measures, and date ranges to map changes over time.   
 84. See supra note 83. The Gini coefficient measures the amount of income 
inequality in a society by plotting a curve that depicts the share of income 
earned by each income percentile (the Lorenz Curve) and then generating a 
ratio that reflects the degree to which that curve diverges from a perfectly 
proportionate income dispersion. See, e.g., LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECO-
NOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 126–28, fig. 5-1 (2002). Zero would repre-
sent perfect equality and one would represent perfect inequality (where one 
person receives 100% of national income). 
  
1080 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:1051 
 
contemporary difference between Canada (0.316 in 2011) and 
Russia (0.396 in 2010).85  
It is of course possible that Congress responds nimbly 
through tax policy to distributive changes that emanate from 
legal rules while letting stand distributive changes that ema-
nate from other sources. But it is difficult to imagine the set  
of institutional features that would produce such a pattern.86 
Consider, for example, the fact that most voters have little idea 
of the true distributive picture.87 Such lack of awareness seems 
more consistent with generalized nonresponsiveness to distrib-
                                                                                       
 85. See supra note 83. Another way to frame the empirical issue is to note 
that the wide variation in pre-tax income over the century has not been 
matched by corresponding fluctuations in tax rates. Compare Emmanuel Saez, 
Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated 
with 2014 Preliminary Estimates) 4 (June 25, 2015), http://eml.berkeley.edu/ 
~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2014.pdf (“[T]he top percentile has gone through 
enormous fluctuations along the course of the twentieth century, from about 
18 percent before WWI, to a peak to almost 24 percent in the late 1920s, to 
only about 9 percent during the 1960s–1970s, and back to almost 23.5 percent 
by 2007.”), with H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 114 
(1995) (indicating, at table 6.2, remarkable stability in effective income tax 
rates over time). 
 86. One theory might be that Congress has few fixed preferences about 
distribution as such, but fastidiously undoes distributive legal rules to main-
tain its own dominance among governmental actors in setting distributive 
policy. But there is no evidence of this. Another possibility might be that other 
sources of distributive change generally move in tandem with Congress’s own 
distributive preferences or actually change Congress’s own distributive prefer-
ences, whereas legal rules are not thought to do so. But this argument is non-
falsifiable and cannot on its own be used to support a conjecture that is at odds 
with the weight of available evidence. See infra Parts III.A.1 and B.1 (discuss-
ing issues of tautology and burden of proof). 
 87. See, e.g., John R. Chambers, Lawton K. Swan & Martin Heesacker, 
Better off than We Know: Distorted Perceptions of Incomes and Income Inequal-
ity in America, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 613 (2014) (finding that Americans underesti-
mate average incomes, overestimate the current income gap between top and 
bottom quintiles, and overestimate the rise of this measure of inequality over 
time); Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely, Building a Better America—One 
Wealth Quintile at a Time, 6 PERSP. PSYCH. SCI. 9 (2011) (finding in a nation-
ally representative online panel that people perceived wealth distribution as 
far more equal than it actually is, and that they desired wealth distributions 
that were even more equitable than these erroneous estimates); Vladimir 
Gimpelson & Daniel Treisman, Misperceiving Inequality (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 21174, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w21174 (using large-scale cross-national surveys to show that individuals 
know little about economic inequality in their nation); see also Sorapop Kiat-
ponsan & Michael Norton, How Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A Universal 
Desire for More Equal Pay, 9 PERSP. PSYCH. SCI. 587 (2014) (using survey data 
from forty countries to trace misperceptions about CEO pay versus average 
worker pay, and finding divergence among actual, perceived, and “ideal pay” 
for CEOs). 
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utive shocks than with selective political responses based on 
the source of the distributive change. In the absence of any evi-
dence that Congress is consistently offsetting redistributive le-
gal rules in the real world, we take its real world nonrespon-
siveness as strong circumstantial evidence against distributive 
invariance.  
Further evidence of distributive invariance is provided by 
another readily observable fact: individuals and groups contin-
ually incur considerable political costs to win distributive fights 
over legal rules and non-tax policy. Consistent with public 
choice theory, individuals and groups fight to get a larger share 
of societal wealth. We think this point is beyond question, but 
here are some examples. Trade associations and public interest 
groups support litigation to influence distributive outcomes, 
such as whether public school teachers must have tenure or 
whether greater punishments for crack than powder cocaine 
trafficking are constitutional.88 Congress cannot close unneeded 
military bases without employing special procedures (pre-
commitment to an up or down vote on the recommendation of a 
base closing commission) because representatives of the locali-
ties where bases are located fight so hard to preserve the dis-
tribution of wealth that base-related jobs create.89 Legislators 
and lobby groups fight over free trade agreements because, 
whatever the net effects, some individuals and localities will 
lose from foreign competition and the losers do not expect to be 
fully compensated by the winners.90  
None of these expensive and long-lasting distributional 
battles make much sense if the tax-and-transfer system will 
reliably undo all of them. Given distributional invariance, peo-
ple would fight only over competing views about the efficiency 
of legal rules and non-tax policies (because economic growth 
would make their fixed distributional slice worth more). Politi-
cal winners and losers would not otherwise expect, respectively, 
to gain or lose income, except in the very short run before the 
                                                                                       
 88. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing tenure example); 
David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1283, 1303–06 (1995) (discussing failed equal protection clause challenges to 
the racial disparity created by the punishment differentials for crack and 
powder cocaine). In 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing Act, Public 
Law 111-220, to reduce the crack-powder punishment disparity.  
 89. See, e.g., Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of Govern-
ment by Commission, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 331 (1991). 
 90. See, e.g., William H. Kaempfer, Edward Tower & Thomas D. Willett, 
Trade Protectionism, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 550–76 
(Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004). 
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congressional offset occurred. Short run distributional stakes 
would usually be too low to justify large expenditures to affect 
the outcome. But all of these points describe another world, not 
our reality. The simplest explanation for pervasive distribu-
tional battles is that everyone knows they can affect distribu-
tion in the long run. 
But why would they expect such variance? To bolster these 
empirical observations, we offer some theory. The rest of this 
Part seeks to explain why there is not a single distributive 
equilibrium, i.e., why political action costs vary with the form 
that redistribution takes. To begin, even the simple assumption 
that action is costlier than inaction produces enough variance 
to make implausible the idea that distributive results would 
remain unchanged no matter how we set up legal rules and in-
stitutions.91 Other reasons include the fact that distributive 
efforts are carried out at multiple levels of a federal system, 
that psychological phenomena like framing and salience  
influence political acceptability, and that fairness preferences 
play a role in producing political results. 
For all these reasons, we would expect to see variation in 
political action costs, which we define broadly to capture all of 
the impediments parties encounter in achieving desired dis-
tributive outcomes through legal coercion, whether through leg-
islation, litigation, or regulation. While a full explication of the 
types and determinants of political action costs lies beyond the 
scope of the present project, it is helpful to briefly classify them 
in a chronological manner similar to the taxonomy that Carl 
Dahlman used (and Coase later embraced) for transaction 
costs.92  In Dahlman’s schema, there are “search and infor-
mation costs,” “bargaining and decision costs,” and “policing 
and enforcement costs.”93  
Parallels can be found in the context of political action. 
Proponents of a distributive change must initially identify op-
portunities to carry out shifts in the desired direction, whether 
those shifts involve new changes or offsets of undesired chang-
                                                                                       
 91. See, e.g., Barak Orbach, A State of Inaction: Regulatory Preferences, 
Rent, and Income Inequality, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 45 (2015). 
 92. See COASE, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Carl J. Dahlman, The Problem 
of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979)). 
 93. Dahlman, supra note 92 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE 
L.J. 611, 614–16 (1989) (noting temporal organization of this taxonomy and 
proposing a functional alternative). 
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es.94 After this search or opportunity-spotting phase is com-
plete, costs must be incurred to bring the proposed distributive 
change to the attention of a relevant decisionmaking body and 
convince the decisionmaker to undertake it.95 These costs in-
clude coordinating collective action, framing the proposal, lob-
bying or litigating for it, and so on. This might be understood as 
a decision influencing stage designed to bring the party in pow-
er to the point of deciding to carry out the distributive change. 
Finally, there is an execution, enforcement, and maintenance 
phase that consists of actually undertaking the costs to effect 
the distributive shift and ensuring that the efforts are not side-
lined or undone by others.96 With these three broad phases in 
mind, we turn to some of the mechanisms that could cause  
these costs to be higher or lower depending on the distributive 
avenue elected. 
B. OFFSETS AND INERTIA 
The invariance hypothesis is premised on the ability of 
Congress to offset distributive changes occurring elsewhere in 
the system (whether to correct maldistributions unintentionally 
generated by other actors, or to beat back aspirational efforts to 
change distribution in ways that clash with congressional pref-
erences). Taken literally, the hypothesis assumes that it is no 
more costly for Congress to restore its preferred distributive 
pattern after a disruption to it than it is to maintain it in the 
absence of that disruption. A focus on political action costs sug-
gests several reasons why restoration might be more costly 
than mere continuation of the preexisting distributive pattern.  
                                                                                       
 94. This requires, among other things, identifying an institution capable 
of producing the desired shift. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 7 (1990) (“Institutions, 
together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the op-
portunities in a society.”). For this reason and others, analysis of institutions 
and institutional change connects tightly to political action costs.  
 95. Capturing the necessary attention may be the most difficult hurdle in 
many instances. See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY 
CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 68–89 (2009).  
 96. Thus, the political action costs of realizing a desired distributive pat-
tern depend in part on how costly it is for a body with contrary preferences to 
counteract the change. If countermands are costless, the political action costs 
of achieving change through the selected body are infinite. This category of 
executing, enforcing, and maintaining also overlaps to some degree with ad-
ministrative costs that have been discussed in prior analyses. See supra note 
31. Although a welfarist analysis would count all costs, our interest in this 
paper is in drawing attention to the previously neglected costs of overcoming 
impediments that are political rather than administrative in nature.  
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First, there are search and information costs in noticing 
that there is a distributive change to counteract and assessing 
what it would take to counteract it. Second, there may be costs 
that fall into the decision-influencing stage, to the extent that 
the very existence of the target distributive action has altered 
the political equilibrium—whether by creating entrenched, con-
centrated interests who are now invested in not losing what 
they have gained, demonstrating the wisdom of the distributive 
change in question, or otherwise.97 Third, there are costs in 
simply implementing and executing the offsetting action.  
1. Imprecise and Incomplete Offsetting 
Kaplow and Shavell separately acknowledge that offsetting 
is likely to be less than absolute. Shavell says “no one would 
really expect the income tax structure to be adjusted in  
response to each and every change in legal rules.”98 Kaplow 
states: “one would not expect tax adjustments to offset the ben-
efits of new public projects completely and precisely.”99 Thus, 
for example, if Congress funds the creation of dams for flood 
control or places military bases in economically depressed areas 
and thereby redistributes to the poor, we would not expect 
Congress to “completely and precisely” offset that form of non-
tax redistribution with an adjustment to taxes that recoups 
that benefit from the poor.  
Both imprecision and incompleteness in offsetting deserve 
attention. Offsetting is imprecise to the extent that it does not 
restore all individuals to their pre-change distributive status. 
Suppose we assume that Congress will use a broad-based tax 
instrument keyed to income to offset the distributive effects of a 
legal rule that affects only a subset of the population in ways 
that correlate only roughly with income. As a result, offsetting 
will necessarily be haphazard and imprecise. Distributive in-
variance, accomplished in this manner, can at most mean 
something like preserving a society-wide Gini coefficient or en-
suring that members of particular income deciles or quartiles 
fare equally well or poorly, on average. Depending on the par-
                                                                                       
 97. See, e.g., Markovits, supra note 5, at 599–601; cf. Tom Ginsburg, Jona-
than S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams, Libertarian Paternalism, Path De-
pendence, and Temporary Law, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 291, 326 (2014) (observing 
that the passage of a law provides information and resolves uncertainty be-
cause “[a]fter the law has been passed, policy makers can observe the new 
state of the world and determine the law’s effects”).  
 98. Shavell, supra note 15, at 417.  
 99. Kaplow, Public Goods, supra note 15, at 521. 
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ticular social welfare function in use, however, this may or may 
not count as an equivalent distributive result.  
Incomplete offsetting means that some non-tax distributive 
changes will stick. This means it is possible to increase, to some 
unspecified degree, the amount of redistribution by adding non-
tax mechanisms to the tax mechanism. It also means that un-
wanted distributive changes that might accompany the adop-
tion of efficient legal rules will go uncorrected to at least some 
extent. If we should expect imprecise and incomplete offsetting 
of the distributive effects of the legislature’s own handiwork, 
we would expect offsetting to be even less precise and complete 
when another governmental body (e.g., the courts or adminis-
trative agencies, or any of the fifty states or the tens of thou-
sands of local jurisdictions) does the redistribution. Congress 
would presumably be less aware of, and feel less electoral ac-
countability for the redistribution carried out by other govern-
mental bodies. 
2. Legislative Inertia  
The qualifications above dovetail with the well discussed 
ideas of legislative inertia and entrenchment. A standard ob-
servation is that it is easier to maintain the status quo than to 
change it.100 Congressional bicameralism and the committee 
system, not to mention the Senatorial filibuster, create multiple 
legislative veto points, and parliamentary procedure allows 
party leaders to set the agenda, all of which makes it possible 
to defeat legislation that is supported by the median voter.101 
Because there are political costs to enacting legislative changes 
                                                                                       
 100. For an extended analysis of the reasons the status quo is so difficult to 
change, see generally BAUMGARTNER ET AL., supra note 95. Baumgartner and 
his coauthors identify the division of power in the political system and limited 
attention as primary reasons for the stickiness of the status quo. See id. at 43–
44, 88.  
 101. Significant strands of political science and economics claim that legis-
lative policy responds to the demands of the median voter. See, e.g., ROBERT S. 
ERIKSON, MICHAEL B. MACKUEN & JAMES A. STIMSON, THE MACRO POLITY 
(2002); Roger D. Congleton, The Median Voter Model, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC CHOICE, supra note 90, at 707; Dennis C. Mueller, Majority Rule—
Positive Properties, in PUBLIC CHOICE II 58 (1989). But significant scholarship 
also identifies the ways that legislative structure produces results contrary to 
the median voter theory. See, e.g., Keith Krehbiel, Legislative Organization, 18 
J. ECON. PERSP. 113 (2004); McNollgast (Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll & 
Barry Weingast), Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 16–19 (1994) (describ-
ing the role of “veto gates” and agenda setting in generating legislation and 
the limits it places on majoritarian decisionmaking). 
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to the status quo, existing law can diverge to some degree from 
legislative preferences (however that is understood, such as the 
preferences of the median legislator).  
Consider statutory interpretation. Courts have some lati-
tude in interpreting statutes because the legislature will not 
overturn every decision that diverges even slightly from its pre-
ferred outcome. The literature on strategic judging posits that 
judges seek to indulge their policy preferences to the maximum 
degree possible without overstepping the bounds of legislative 
inertia.102 The complexities of political organizing to overcome 
collective action problems in the formation of winning coalitions 
mean that tactical victories can lead to strategic victories.103 
Distributive invariance would require a political process that is 
far more simple and deterministic than the one we appear to 
have.  
The inertia we see in legislative action logically extends to 
the issue of distribution. However, there are some differences 
in the tax-and-transfer realm. Perhaps most significantly, get-
ting taxes on the agenda and implementing changes to them is 
trivial; there is major tax reform every few years as well as an-
nual technical changes, such as adjusting the alternative min-
imum tax. 104  Search and information costs—here, knowing 
                                                                                       
 102. See, e.g., Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations To Over-
ride: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 503, 503 (1996) (“[R]ecent positive political analyses of Supreme Court 
decision making . . . emphasized that the Court makes its [statutory] decisions 
in a way that insulates them from legislative override. The Court, for example, 
may make a decision that takes advantage of the legislative decision-making 
process (such as bicameralism . . . or the committee system), which can insure 
against a legislative override.” (footnote omitted)); see also John A. Ferejohn & 
Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 263 (1992); Alicia Uribe, James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hans-
ford, The Influence of Congressional Preferences of Legislative Overrides of 
Supreme Court Decisions, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 921 (2014).  
 103. These complexities help to solve a puzzle that our rejection of distribu-
tive invariance presents: why the forces contending over distribution would 
not deploy their resources in such a manner as to equalize resistance to un-
wanted changes in each arena, rather than effectively overinvesting in re-
sistance in some arenas relative to others. An answer may be found in the 
varying nature of collective action necessary to pursue or resist certain dis-
tributive goals in different contexts. If, for example, stopping redistribution 
through legal rules allows more free-riding by parties affected by the new rule 
than stopping redistribution through tax-and-transfer, more investments may 
be made in the latter than the former. Cf. Dhammika Dharmapala, The Con-
gressional Budget Process, Aggregate Spending, and Statutory Budget Rules, 
90 J. PUB. ECON. 119 (2006).  
 104. See Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra 
note 36, at 174 (citing estimates of 15,000 tax code changes since 1986). 
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what distributive changes have occurred that might require 
offsetting—might also be streamlined through aggregate data 
about distribution. 105  Yet the fact that Congress routinely 
makes technical changes to the tax code and has access to use-
ful data compilations does not mean that it revisits fundamen-
tal distributive policy regularly, much less that it persistently 
returns distribution to some single set point. We suspect that 
distribution is subject to political cycling and that some method 
of entrenchment of any given result is necessary to terminate 
cycling through all distributive possibilities.106 Once an out-
come is in place, interest groups will exploit legislative veto 
points to block legislative readjustments.107 As a result, we 
would not expect to see redistributive legal rules consistently 
counteracted, either à la carte or en masse.108  
                                                                                       
 105. See id. at 174–75. But see Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 
15, at 675 (observing that it may remain important to trace distributive effects 
of legal rules “because those formulating income tax policy need to be aware of 
any significant distributive effects of legal rules that would not otherwise be 
apparent, such as from studying information on the actual distribution of in-
come”). 
 106. See, e.g., ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 677–85 
(2d ed. 2002) (explaining how the process of legislation works to make change 
difficult); Nicholas R. Miller, Majority Rule and Minority Interests, in POLITI-
CAL ORDER: NOMOS XXXVIII 207, 241 (Ian Shapiro and Russell Hardin eds., 
1993) (explaining why, in “distributive politics, majority rule is chaotic and 
cannot be blamed or credited for any particular outcome”); John C. Roberts & 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Profes-
sors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1773, 1814–16 (2003) (identifying 
reasons that the structure and process of legislation works to entrench exist-
ing legislation).  
 107. See Francis Fukuyama, Oh for a Democratic Dictatorship and Not a 
Vetocracy, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ 
d82776c6-14fd-11e1-a2a6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zg7rjoNs (describing the 
contemporary American form of government as a “vetocracy”). Put differently, 
the asymmetry between the political action costs of preserving the status quo 
and changing it produces path dependence in distributive legislation. See 
Bradley A. Hansen & Mary Eschelbach Hansen, The Role of Path Dependence 
in the Development of US Bankruptcy Law, 1880–1938, 3 J. INST’L ECON. 203 
(2007); Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-
Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 
(2001). See generally Scott E. Page, Path Dependence, 1 Q.J. POL. SCI. 87 
(2006) (reviewing the use of path dependence in political science theory). 
 108. See, for example, Markovits, supra note 5, at 600, for some reasons 
why such countering might not occur, including “the fact that legislators may 
have to incur special costs to pass legislation that in effect reverses judicial 
decisions, changes the jurisdiction of the courts, controls who is appointed to 
the courts, or packs the courts.” Markovits goes on to observe that the judicial 
decision may itself “deter legislative efforts to offset the redistributions the 
court effectuated by changing the information, distributional values, or 
awareness of the concrete implications of given distributional values of the 
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Here we note one interesting source of distributive en-
trenchment that we think features in a lot of tax and non-tax 
distribution: coalition-building through leakage. As we noted 
above, another standard (but merely contingent) reason to op-
pose redistribution through non-tax law is that it will be poorly 
targeted, causing a form of redistributive leakage. If we assume 
that redistribution is appropriately targeted at those who have 
lower incomes, then a tax rule that is based on a precise meas-
urement of incomes will select suitable recipients more accu-
rately than will a legal rule that depends on a proxy for income 
or wealth.109 Such a legal rule will sometimes redistribute away 
from, rather than toward, the intended targets.   
Yet this apparent defect of leakage could be a feature ra-
ther than a bug for those seeking redistribution, depending on 
how it changes the costs of political action. Those who benefit 
from leakage are induced to prefer the redistributive scheme 
that produces it. This is why universalist welfare programs en-
joy greater political stability than targeted programs and may 
accomplish more redistribution to the poor despite not being 
limited to that purpose.110 Similarly, a judicial decision aimed 
at benefiting the mostly poor neighbors of a polluting factory 
might be less prone to being undone legislatively if it also inci-
dentally benefitted a few wealthy neighbors with political 
clout.111 If the political assistance of the wealthy neighbors is 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
members of the legislature in question and/or their constituents,” or otherwise 
alerting the legislature to how much a particular distributive change is val-
ued. Id. at 600–01. 
 109. Income is not, of course, the only possible metric for redistribution. 
Income is often viewed as a mere proxy for the real variable of interest, ability. 
Moreover, there are many ways that people can become less well off that 
might be more appropriately measured through metrics other than income. 
For example, they might be less healthy or less happy. Without endorsing 
income as the best possible target for all redistributive efforts, we will assume 
for purposes of the present discussion that it is the relevant variable, and that 
legal rules are likely to be less good than tax rules at identifying recipients. 
See Logue & Avraham, supra note 32, at 207–52. If some other metric of well-
being measured who should be the target of redistributive efforts, legal rules 
might do a better job of targeting in some cases. See, e.g., id.; Sanchirico, supra 
note 26.  
 110. See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Can Joe the Plumber Support Redistribution? 
Law, Social Preferences, and Sustainable Policy Design, 64 TAX L. REV. 313 
(2011). 
 111. The example in the text assumes that a very precise legislative coun-
termand would be sought—one that would turn all of the previous winners 
into losers and vice versa. This is where leakage would have political traction. 
If the offsetting were cruder so that it only lowered the position of low-income 
people in general, and did not reduce the position of those well-off people who 
fortuitously happened to win out through “leaky” legal rules, then the political 
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pivotal—the legislature overrules the court if and only if the 
sole beneficiaries are the poor—then leakage produces more 
redistribution than no leakage. Whatever one may think of this 
normatively, the possibility that it could happen (without being 
legislatively undone) undermines the invariance hypothesis. 
3. Offsetting and Inertia in a Federal System 
There are additional reasons to doubt that distributive 
changes will be counterbalanced to produce an invariant dis-
tributive outcome. First is the fact that there are fifty states 
and tens of thousands of local governments that are involved in 
making distributive choices,112 both through taxation choices 
and the development of legal rules and policies that affect dis-
tribution.113 The conventional wisdom is that all redistribution 
should occur at centralized levels to avoid the problem of a tax 
base with feet.114 If people can simply move to avoid being on 
the losing end of redistribution, local redistributive efforts will 
accomplish nothing more than introducing costly distortions in 
locational decisions. Nonetheless, states and localities often 
undertake efforts that have redistributive aims,115 and at least 
some of these efforts are likely to redistribute in the contem-
plated direction to some extent. How do these real-world efforts 
fit into the invariance hypothesis? 
Suppose that the Texas Supreme Court adopts a new ap-
proach to eminent domain compensation under the state consti-
tution that effectively increases the compensation provided to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
advantage indicated in the text would not hold. However, in that case invari-
ance would be independently undermined by the lack of precision in the coun-
termand. Similar analysis would apply if the factory owner seeks offsetting 
advantages through other channels—ones that do not directly and precisely 
burden the parties who benefited from the legal rule. 
 112. As of 2012, there were 38,910 general-purpose local governments 
(which includes counties, municipalities, and towns or townships). See LYNN 
A. BAKER ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (5th ed. 
2015) (citing U.S. Census Bureau data). While local governments exhibit het-
erogeneity in terms of their powers to tax and to enact overtly redistributive 
policies, virtually all local governments hold the power to make choices that 
will have distributive implications.  
 113. See Brian Galle, Is Local Consumer Protection Law a Better Redistrib-
utive Mechanism than the Tax System?, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 
530–40 (2010). 
 114. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Local Redistribution, Living Wage Ordi-
nances, and Judicial Intervention, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2007) (ref-
erencing the “conventional wisdom that localities should play little role in ful-
filling the redistributive functions of government”).  
 115. See id.  
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low-income displaced households.116 Texas does not have an 
income tax and therefore cannot make adjustments to it to 
counteract this change. Nor does it seem plausible that Con-
gress would respond to this legal change in Texas by altering 
the structure of the federal income tax. It could alter the pro-
gressivity of the income tax generally, or adjust the Earned In-
come Tax Credit (EITC) program, in order to produce a change 
that would bring the average distributive results back to a 
baseline, but only by affecting many people outside Texas, and 
many within Texas who did not suffer condemnations.117 A 
more targeted response would be possible, though it seems even 
less plausible. For example, Congress could treat amounts of 
compensation received through the Texas program as offsets 
against any amounts the household would receive through the 
EITC. 
An empirical question is whether we actually observe such 
efforts to directly counteract distributive changes made at a 
lower level of government. One indication that we do not is 
found in recent work by Eric Kades that advocates for a new 
federal tax adjustment to offset the increasing regressivity of 
state and local taxes.118 If federal tax policy does not already 
routinely counteract the regressivity of state and local tax poli-
cy, it seems even more far-fetched to imagine it will undo the 
distributive effects of substantive law developed by state courts 
or enacted by state or local legislative bodies.  
Does the absence of jurisdictional offsetting disprove the 
invariance hypothesis?119 Invariance proponents might argue 
                                                                                       
 116. Although this example involves a state, it could just as easily be an 
example involving a locality. For example, the City of Chicago might enact a 
housing policy that operates to the benefit of lower-income residents.  
 117. Note that such an offset would only produce results that count as dis-
tributively equivalent under a social welfare function that is indifferent to 
whether people in, say, the entire bottom decile are benefited a little, or 
whether instead a small subset of geographically clustered people falling in 
that decile are benefited a lot. 
 118. See Eric Kades, Corrective Progressivity (2015) (unpublished manu-
script), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2621356. Although 
each state has, in aggregate, a regressive tax system, there is great variance 
among the states in the degree of regressivity. See id. at 16–21. Offsetting 
would therefore require state-specific federal tax adjustments, as Kades advo-
cates. See id. at 21–41 (detailing how the corrective progressivity approach 
would work).  
 119. Importantly, our focus here is on targeted responses that would direct-
ly counter specific redistributive efforts. These kinds of countermands could 
not be informed by aggregate data in the manner suggested by Weisbach, Dis-
tributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 174–75. Broad-
er countermands directed at the income distribution generally, nationwide, 
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that state and local distributive changes are not commonly un-
done because they contribute to the maximization of (what has 
just then become) society’s current social welfare function. This 
is a subspecies of a tautological theory we will have more to say 
about below.120 It suffices for now to observe that this argument 
would require us to make the highly unrealistic assumption 
that Congress is constantly evaluating the distributive inci-
dence of all the policies (not just the tax policies) of tens of 
thousands of subnational jurisdictions in order to determine 
which tax changes to implement—and refrain from implement-
ing—federally.121  
4. A Note About Magnitude  
Perhaps readers accept that the invariance hypothesis is 
technically false, but conjecture that the magnitude of variance 
is sufficiently small that the doctrine of tax superiority survives 
intact. Have K&S gotten things right to a first approximation, 
so that we are quibbling over the distributive equivalent of 
rounding errors? We do not think so. The discussion above pro-
vides ample support for the idea that distribution must diverge 
from Congress’s ideal point by some nontrivial amount before 
any corrective action will be taken.122 Changes short of this 
triggering amount fall within what we might call a Margin of 
Inaction (MOI). The sections below discuss some factors that 
can make corrective or countervailing congressional action 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
are possible but would not likely produce meaningful distributive equivalence, 
as noted above. See supra note 117.  
 120. See infra Part III.A.1.  
 121. An alternative claim might be that the social welfare function is set 
independently by each state and locality, so that whatever we actually observe 
at the state or local level represents the invariant local distributive result for 
that particular place at that particular time. This claim does not mesh well 
with tax superiority, however, both because it cuts against the usual prefer-
ence for centralized redistribution and because states and localities do not 
always even possess traditional tax and transfer tools. Even where tax-and-
transfer tools are available to states or localities, they may involve higher pro-
cedural hurdles (such as supermajority rules) or produce greater distortions, 
making it implausible that the same distributive outcome would result locally 
regardless of the route selected. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 113 (positing that 
local redistributive efforts undertaken through non-tax means are less likely 
to suffer from the distortionary effects that local taxation is generally thought 
to occasion).  
 122. The idea that attention is a scarce and crucial input to legislative 
change is consistent with a model in which effects can accumulate unredressed 
for quite some time before triggering a response. See BAUMGARTNER ET AL., 
supra note 95, at 43–44. 
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slower to come, causing the MOI to grow. It is likely, therefore, 
that the MOI is large, at least in some contexts.  
Even a fixed and small MOI is devastating to the categori-
cal claim of tax superiority, however. This is clear when we 
consider again the stance of distributive agnosticism taken by 
K&S and other legal economists. As long as legal rules can pro-
duce some durable distributive variance, that variance will be 
enough on some imaginable social welfare function to make a 
difference to welfare. This is enough to make the choice of dis-
tributive mechanism indeterminate.  
Moreover, tax superiority has traction as a normative pre-
scription only as contrasted with some other actually available 
means of redistribution. Thus, the crucial variable is not the 
absolute size of the MOI, but its size relative to the power 
courts and other governmental actors have to advance welfare 
through their distributive choices. Suppose, for example, that 
courts or executives adopt inefficient rules only when: (1) the 
inefficiency is small; (2) they have good evidence that the rule 
will actually affect distribution in a welfare-enhancing direc-
tion (after accounting for haphazardness and contracting-
around);123 and (3) doing so otherwise fits within the zone of 
discretion that they have been afforded within their institu-
tional roles. If these worthwhile distributive opportunities are 
sufficiently scarce and limited in scope, the entire set of them 
may fall within even a relatively small MOI—meaning that if 
courts take every worthwhile opportunity to redistribute, they 
cannot cumulatively change distribution enough to trigger a 
congressional reaction.124  
We need not assume that the MOI is fixed, of course. We 
might expect it to vary depending on a variety of factors that 
influence the salience and political valence of different distribu-
tive shifts. For example, there might be a different trigger point 
for corrective offsetting than for aspirational offsetting. Thus, 
even if we posit that Congress will be relatively quick to coun-
teract efforts to overtly improve distribution through non-tax 
                                                                                       
 123. Although usually presented as complements to the K&S distortion 
argument, the contracting-around and haphazardness objections narrow the 
set of available distributive opportunities that might be exploited through 
legal rules. They therefore make it more likely that the remaining opportuni-
ties will fall within the operative MOI.  
 124. It is possible, of course, that redistributive opportunities exceed the 
MOI. While this complicates the advice that welfarists might receive, as we 
discuss below, it does not alter the basic point that a positive MOI disproves 
invariance and with it the categorical claim of tax superiority. See infra notes 
187–91 and accompanying text.  
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means, it does not follow that it will be equally quick to correct 
the unintended distributive consequences of newly adopted effi-
cient legal rules, much less that it will nimbly keep up with so-
cietal changes or rent-seeking opportunities that worsen  
distribution relative to its ideal point.125 The possibility that 
Congress will lag in its corrective role widens the space within 
which a court or other actor could effect distributive improve-
ments. 
The following sections discuss a number of other reasons 
that offsetting behavior might vary depending on the source 
and characteristics of the distributive change. Although the 
questions are empirical ones, there is no reason to assume that 
the MOI is so small across all contexts as to make invariance a 
serviceable foundation for tax superiority. 
C. FRAMING, SALIENCE, AND COGNITIVE BIASES  
In recent years, large literatures have investigated how 
human cognitive features may systematically alter the percep-
tion of, and hence the response to, a variety of policies and legal 
rules. One line of analysis, which we will not revisit here, is 
whether the labor-leisure distortion thought to be common to 
all redistributive efforts is actually attenuated in some contexts 
by cognitive features like optimism.126 We are interested in-
stead in how the packaging and framing of redistribution influ-
ences the political action costs of enacting and maintaining it.  
                                                                                       
 125. Rent-seeking by the rich is arguably a major cause of rising inequali-
ty. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY 39–64 (2012); Josh 
Bivens & Lawrence Mishel, The Pay of Corporate Executives and Financial 
Professionals as Evidence of Rents in Top 1 Percent Incomes, 27(3) J. ECON. 
PERSP., Summer 2013, at 57, 62–71; Orbach, supra note 91, at 48–55. See gen-
erally Gerrit De Geest, Removing Rents: Why the Legal System Is Superior to 
the Income Tax at Reducing Income Inequality (Washington Univ. in St. Louis 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-10-02, 2013), http://papers 
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2337720. 
 126. See Jolls, supra note 26, at 1658–74. For example, a legal rule that 
collects more from wealthy tortfeasors would apply only to the subset of 
wealthy people involved in accidents—the odds of which people are likely to 
underestimate. A counterargument is that insurance markets could turn the 
uncertain loss into a more certain one. See Logue & Avraham, supra note 32, 
at 199–201. But see Jolls, supra note 26, at 1663–66 (observing that insurance 
does not yield complete certainty, given factors like deductibles and experience 
rating). Though we find Jolls’s arguments somewhat persuasive, nothing in 
this paper depends on accepting them. Our arguments apply whether the as-
sumption that the labor-leisure distortion is invariant across methods of redis-
tribution is true or false.  
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For example, one of the most consistent and important 
findings of prospect theory is that people weight losses more 
heavily than gains.127 Thus, framing a particular interaction as 
one that produces a loss would be expected to generate more 
disutility and more political resistance than framing it as a 
mere failure to achieve a gain. Legal rules and policies that 
have distributive implications might be susceptible of either 
frame, depending on how they are presented and perceived. 
Although design details can accentuate or downplay this effect, 
tax-and-transfer mechanisms tend to highlight the taking away 
of something from a person who had previously been endowed 
with it, and hence are likely to set off cognitive alarms that 
might be more muted where institutional arrangements assign 
resources in a different manner in the first instance. Consider 
this example: 
 
  Human Organs. Imagine that at the moment a new 
transplant technology first becomes medically possible, 
the state enacts a law that does two things: (1) it per-
mits medical institutions, under some circumstances, to 
buy certain human organs; and (2) it effectively prohib-
its individuals from purchasing organs, forcing alloca-
tion by some institutional notion of medical need.  
 
This rule has a strong distributive effect favoring the poor 
(the poor would have the option of selling, but would not have 
to outbid the rich to obtain organs). Yet because it is enacted at 
the moment that transplantation surgery first becomes possi-
ble, the fact that the wealthy cannot outbid the poor for their 
organs is unlikely to be experienced as a loss. The rule prevents 
the value of wealth from rising by forbidding one possible new 
use,128 but nothing is “taken” from the wealthy, neither money 
nor a previously exercised privilege. The alternative policy, 
based on tax superiority, might instead tax the rich and use the 
                                                                                       
 127. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An 
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279 (1979); Nathan 
Novemsky & Daniel Kahneman, The Boundaries of Loss Aversion, 42 J. MAR-
KETING RES. 119, 123–25 (2005) (noting some limits on loss aversion, including 
its absence in contexts where money is spent “as intended” for purchases). The 
same economic impact can be coded as a loss or as a failure to achieve a gain, 
depending on how the outcome is framed. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 333–34 (1984).   
 128. Constraining the sphere of money cabins its power and reach. See 
generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY (2012); MICHAEL 
WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).  
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revenue to give the poor more money, which they could use for 
buying organs if they so chose. In this case, however, the added 
tax would take away money the rich had previously earned 
(even though they would receive implicit compensation by now 
being able to use the rest of their wealth to bid for organs in an 
open market, albeit against poor people who are now somewhat 
less poor). Here, the non-tax mechanism plausibly has lower 
political action costs than the tax mechanism.  
Although the timing of the distributive rule to coincide 
with the emergence of a new technology helps to do the framing 
work in Human Organs, other factors such as bundling can also 
contribute to framing. Consider: 
 
  Landfill. An agency must choose a neighborhood in 
which to site a landfill. Such a locally undesirable land 
use will cause property values in the surrounding area 
to fall. Because this drop in property values will likely 
result in lower-income people living near the landfill 
(whether they were there initially or not) there is an ef-
ficiency case for placing the landfill in the less wealthy 
neighborhood.129 Suppose this causes an unwanted dis-
tributive result—making people who are already less 
well-off even worse off. This distributive problem could 
be addressed in one of two ways: (1) by granting the low-
income neighborhood in which the siting will occur a 
countervailing set of valuable rights over the landfill’s 
operation, priority for jobs at the landfill, priority for lo-
cal redevelopment efforts, and so on; or (2) a tax-and-
transfer system could redistribute to low-income people 
to make up for the fact that efficient land use decisions 
will often disadvantage them distributively.  
 
Under the first approach, the role of “landfill host” would 
comprise a unified package of benefits and detriments—and the 
benefits might be of sufficient magnitude to cause competition 
over which neighborhood will get to host the landfill.130 This 
                                                                                       
 129. For a discussion of the fairness and efficiency implications of different 
siting choices, some of which may turn on the responses of neighboring popu-
lations to those choices, see generally Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do 
with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land 
Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001 (1993); cf. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 12, at 
143–44 (providing an example involving the converse case of siting a park that 
would increase property values, potentially spurring the rich to move in and 
the poor to move out).  
 130. Similarly, past distributive impacts of siting decisions might be ad-
dressed in kind, as through the transformation of a former landfill site into a 
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bundling of benefits with detriments involves some inefficien-
cies, including the possibility that the benefits will be less val-
uable to recipients than the cash equivalent would be. Low-
income households may also be imperfectly targeted by the as-
sistance. But the bundling avoids the need for a second, and 
overtly redistributive, step. The second approach allows the 
efficient, uncompensated siting to go forward, thus generating 
a new baseline in which low-income people have suffered this 
disadvantage (along with many others wrought by efficient le-
gal rules). There is no way to address this distributive result 
through tax without causing some people to suffer a loss from 
the new baseline—something that will be coded as a stand-
alone loss, and heavily resisted as such.  
Even within the domain of taxes, political action costs can 
vary. A growing literature on tax salience examines how both 
political and market responses can vary depending on the de-
gree of attention a particular tax attracts.131 Taxes that can be 
made lower-salience, as through paycheck withholding or bun-
dling with mortgage payments, may carry lower political action 
costs.132 Bundling redistribution with various forms of social 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
park area. See PETER HARNIK, URBAN GREEN: INNOVATIVE PARKS FOR RESUR-
GENT CITIES 90 (2010) (observing that the redevelopment of former landfills 
into parks may offer “the opportunity to correct what may have been a 
longstanding environmental injustice to the surrounding residents”).  
 131. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxa-
tion: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009); David Gamage & 
Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and Political 
Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011); Andrew T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of 
Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443 (2014); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the 
Salience Bias in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2011); Jacob Gold-
in, Optimal Tax Salience, 131 J. PUB. ECON. 115 (2015). Although this litera-
ture is relatively new, the underlying intuition—that salience matters—is not. 
Decades ago, Milton Friedman expressed concern that the explicit nature of 
the redistribution accomplished through a negative income tax could create 
particular political difficulties. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 
194 (1962).   
 132. See, e.g., DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE BIG 
TAX INCREASE NOBODY NOTICED (Sept. 2014), http://www.cepr.net/documents/ 
ss-poll-2014-08.pdf (reporting and commenting on survey results showing that 
few respondents were aware of the expiration of a payroll tax reduction in 
2013 that increased payroll taxes by two percentage points); Hayashi, supra 
note 131, at 1484–85 (finding homeowners are less likely to appeal property 
tax assessments when the salience of the tax is reduced through mortgage 
escrow); see also Gamage, supra note 31, at 70 (observing that food purchases 
are exempted from VATs and sales taxes, but not from income taxes, and pos-
iting that such differential treatment “depend[s] significantly on the framing 
of different tax instruments—on what forms of special provisions strike politi-
cal actors as acceptable within different tax instruments”). 
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insurance, so that the loss is packaged with a potential future 
benefit, can also make the redistributive element less evident 
and hence less heavily resisted. All of these manipulations 
raise normative questions, as we discuss below.133 Regardless of 
where one comes out on the normative issues, however, the 
very fact that there is often heated debate over how painful and 
apparent redistribution should be suggests that political results 
can vary with a program’s framing. If this were not the case, 
then nothing would turn on decisions that implicate tax sali-
ence. 
Other work finds that people will assess the fairness of a 
tax differently based on details like whether the tax rates are 
expressed in dollars or percentages and whether the tax system 
is bifurcated into separate pieces or unified.134 It is well recog-
nized that penalties and subsidies are often viewed differently, 
despite their identical economic impact. A standard example 
illustrating this point is the different reactions to a child subsi-
dy provided to households versus a childlessness tax imposed 
on households. Nearly all respondents think that a child subsi-
dy should be larger for low-income families. But when the 
frame is flipped and the measure is recast as a tax on child-
lessness, few respondents think that low-income households 
should be taxed more heavily for not bearing children.135 More 
broadly, tax deductions are viewed quite differently from direct 
government grants, despite their identical economic sub-
stance.136  
The cognitive literature thus establishes that people re-
spond differently to measures that have identical incidence de-
pending on how the measures are presented. This variance in 
responses in experimental settings tracks the variance in polit-
ical responses that presumably underlies all manner of rhetori-
                                                                                       
 133. See infra text accompanying notes 195–204.  
 134. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Political Psy-
chology of Redistribution, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1745, 1755–57, 1765–68 (2005).  
 135. The example is from Schelling, and the reversal is known as the Schel-
ling effect. Thomas C. Schelling, Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, 
63 PUB. INT. 37, 53–56 (1981). More recent experiments by McCaffery and 
Baron show the same effect. See McCaffery & Baron, supra note 134, at 1757–
59. 
 136. For example, Justin Wolfers asked how many people would support 
the home mortgage deduction if it were framed as an “explicit government 
handout” that benefits those in the top 1% about twenty-five times more than 
middle-class households. Justin Wolfers, Tax Deductions or Tax Expenditures? 
FREAKONOMICS (Apr. 17, 2012), http://freakonomics.com/2012/04/17/tax 
-deductions-or-tax-expenditures. 
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cal and policy choices.137 The cognitive variance supported by 
existing work strongly undermines the claim of distributive in-
variance. If economically equivalent measures can morph from 
acceptable to unacceptable or vice versa due to substantively 
irrelevant features, we should not expect that the political ac-
tion costs associated with enacting different measures will be 
invariant. And if political action costs are not invariant across 
different methods and formulations of redistribution, then it 
follows that the amount of redistribution that can be accom-
plished through different methods and formulations would also 
vary.  
One objection might be that for any optimally framed and 
presented non-tax legal rule or public policy, there is a superior 
optimally framed and presented tax-and-transfer mechanism. 
It is not clear this is the case, however. An especially interest-
ing finding in the experimental literature to date is the extra 
aversion that people attach to charges that are labeled as tax-
es.138 Moreover, when a salary is stated in pre-tax terms, the 
difference between this amount and what the employee gets to 
keep inevitably appears as a loss. To the extent that loss aver-
sion or an endowment effect makes losing things that one al-
ready has more painful than not receiving things that one nev-
er had, tax-and-transfer may be categorically more cognitively 
painful than alternative approaches that channel entitlements 
to the less well off in the first instance or that structure alloca-
tion systems to produce less salient cross-subsidies.139 Recent 
work also suggests that distrust of government may produce 
less support for redistribution that takes the form of taxes than 
for redistribution that can be accomplished without running 
money through the government’s coffers.140  
                                                                                       
 137. For example, the strategic characterization of the estate tax as a 
“death tax” by its opponents has been credited with catalyzing its widespread 
political unpopularity (which seemed objectively puzzling, given its extraordi-
narily narrow targeting). See, e.g., STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, TAX FAIRNESS AND 
FOLK JUSTICE 144 (2013) (“The conservative leadership sculpted the estate 
tax’s image; they labeled it the ‘death tax’ to influence the public to confront it 
as an ominous, universal problem.”). 
 138. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About 
Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 106, 117–19 (2006) (describing these find-
ings); see also Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framing and Taxa-
tion: Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 J. ECON. 
PSYCHOL. 679 (2004). 
 139. This point also connects to our discussion in the next section, which 
examines how perceptions of fairness interact with political palatability.  
 140. See Ilyana Kuziemko, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie 
Stantcheva, How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from 
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D. FAIRNESS PREFERENCES 
K&S have famously argued that fairness (which they take 
to include any non-welfare value, such as morality, justice, or 
dignity) has no value apart from its effect on welfare.141 We will 
not quarrel with this proposition, but will instead focus on an 
important way in which fairness considerations can affect wel-
fare: by producing distributive variance. Of particular rele-
vance to the present discussion is the capacity for a policy or 
rule’s alignment with fairness intuitions to reduce the political 
resistance associated with its adoption, or to raise the political 
action costs that would be associated with counteracting it 
through some other political means.  
1. Fairness Preferences as Inputs to Political Action Costs 
Individuals typically possess a variety of beliefs and pref-
erences about what is “fair” or “unfair” in particular contexts. 
They frequently think of justice in a local micro-setting, such as 
fairness among neighbors or co-workers, rather than only what 
is fair in a global sense.142 Put in terms of our critique of the 
invariance hypothesis, more redistribution might be done (or 
the same amount might be done more cheaply) through meth-
ods perceived as fair than through methods perceived as un-
fair.143 If the degree to which a particular redistributive effort 
resonates with fairness preferences bears on how cheaply, ef-
fectively, and durably it can be carried out, then the study of 
fairness becomes an important input into welfare maximization 
efforts that depend on achieving particular distributive out-
comes.144  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Randomized Survey Experiments, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1478, 1505 (2015) (find-
ing people resisted changing their views on redistribution in light of new in-
formation because they distrusted government, and that they were therefore 
most affected by information favoring redistribution “for indirect transfer pro-
grams such as the minimum wage that do not involve the government collect-
ing and redistributing tax dollars”). 
 141. The thrust of their view is encapsulated in the title they chose for 
their book exploring this point, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE. See KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra note 23.  
 142. See generally JON ELSTER, LOCAL JUSTICE: HOW INSTITUTIONS ALLO-
CATE SCARCE GOODS AND NECESSARY BURDENS (1992); YOUNG, supra note 85; 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Con-
straint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 
(1986). 
 143. Our concern here is with perceptions of fairness, which are subject to 
a variety of manipulations through policy design, not with making any state-
ments about what is or is not fair in some deontological sense.  
 144. This is one of several reasons why fairness considerations are relevant 
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This point is subtly different from the one K&S and other 
law and economics scholars make when they recognize that 
people may have preferences for fairness, and that satisfying 
those preferences, like satisfying any other preference, can in-
crease welfare directly (that is, people are made better off by 
directly experiencing and observing fairness). This is certainly 
true, and on its own may be extremely important, given that 
some preferences for fairness can only be satisfied within par-
ticular legal contexts.145 But we also envision an instrumental 
role for fairness, as a factor that can reduce the political action 
costs associated with redistribution.   
In other words, using fairness criteria to select and formu-
late redistributive legal rules could ease the political path for 
those rules. Moving a certain number of dollars from one in-
come class to another might generate less political resistance 
when done through a substantive legal rule that is popularly 
perceived as fair than through a tax-and-transfer system that 
is widely viewed as unfair.146 Compare, for example, living 
wage legislation or housing supports that enable workers to 
live in the communities in which they are employed with a tax-
and-transfer program that draws from and benefits the same 
income classes.147 The public might perceive in the latter case 
but not the former that we are taking away money from people 
who have “earned it,” and giving it to others who have not.148  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
to the economic analysis of law. See generally Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. 
McAdams, Introduction, in FAIRNESS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS xiii (Lee Anne 
Fennell & Richard H. McAdams eds., 2013).  
 145. See Yoram Margalioth & Tomer Blumkin, Targeting the Majority: 
Redesigning Racial Profiling, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 340–42 (2006) 
(arguing that equity considerations favor the use of legal rules rather than 
tax-and-transfer in the context of racial profiling).  
 146. This follows from the fact that monetary outcomes are not the sole 
determinants of people’s evaluations. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, 
Taking Outcomes Seriously, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 861.  
 147. This comparison assumes that the legislation in question would actu-
ally benefit the target income class, notwithstanding any supply effects or 
contracting-around that might occur. Although the empirical questions are 
complex, there is some evidence that minimum wage laws, for example, can 
have a net redistributive effect. See Liscow, supra note 2, at 2498 n.46 (review-
ing research on this point). Regardless of whether one agrees with these spe-
cific examples, as long as the universe of rules that both resonate with fairness 
preferences and manage to redistribute in a preferred direction is not a null 
set, the reasoning in the text holds.  
 148. See, e.g., KEREN-PAZ, supra note 45, at 49 (arguing that “a transfer 
payment is more likely to submit the poor to attacks that they are lazy, un-
productive and a burden on hard-working taxpayers” than a change in tort 
compensation rules that is understood as “a manifestation of the substantive 
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If common attitudes about deservingness or desert apply 
differently for substantive legal rules than for the tax system, 
then the political action costs of redistribution through these 
mechanisms will be asymmetric as well. Resistance to overt 
redistribution of income is often fueled by the belief that the 
market system reliably delivers distributionally fair outcomes 
to individuals, and that, therefore, any shortfalls in outcomes 
can be readily connected to personal shortfalls of character or 
effort.149 Those who benefit from the system may easily over-
look the ways in which it fails to meet this model.150 Institu-
tional changes to the “rules of the game” that generate market 
results may have a more powerful and stickier effect on dis-
tributive results if they are understood to be part of an essen-
tially fair process for producing outcomes. Not only are these 
changes more likely to be accepted in the first instance than a 
change that moves money around after the fact in a separate 
step, they are less likely to be counteracted.  
Just as payments for different reasons are not viewed as 
fungible with each other, so too may the amount of assistance 
realistically available depend on the form that it takes and the 
restrictions that it implicitly or explicitly places on recipients. 
Consider, for example, the debate about whether assistance to 
poor people should be provided through an unrestricted cash 
grant or rather in-kind, through food stamps, housing vouch-
                                                                                                                                                                                         
notion of equality before the law according to which it is unacceptable to sys-
tematically expose the poor to higher risks”); MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 
58, at 35 (“If people intuitively feel that they are in an absolute sense morally 
entitled to their net incomes, it is not surprising that politicians can get away 
with describing tax increases (which diminish net income) as taking from the 
people what belongs to them.”).  
 149. See F. A. HAYEK, 2 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY, THE MIRAGE OF 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 73–74 (1976) (expressing ambivalence about “whether with-
out such partly erroneous beliefs [in the deservingness of wealth] the large 
numbers will tolerate actual differences in rewards which will be based only 
partly on achievement and partly on mere chance”).  
 150. For discussions of the self-serving bias, see Linda Babcock & Joshua 
Furgeson, Bounded Rationality in the Settlement Process: Empirical Evidence 
on the Causes of Settlement Failure in Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 360 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2013); Linda Babcock & 
George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving 
Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997); Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, 
Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer, Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bar-
gaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995). For discussion of the literature on 
systems justification bias, see SHEFFRIN, supra note 137, at 49–53. For a gen-
eral claim that people interpret evidence in light of their cultural commit-
ments, see generally Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less 
Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1291 (2003).  
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ers, and so on. An unrestricted cash grant might be expected to 
do a better job of advancing the welfare of recipients because 
they can spend on whatever they value most. But in-kind pro-
vision of assistance is ubiquitous, and it seems extraordinarily 
unlikely that the political will would exist to replace all such 
programs with their cash equivalents.151 One reason might be 
that people view those who are less well off as having only a 
moral claim on certain kinds of resources that better their con-
dition in certain well-defined ways.152 Changing the form may 
remove the rationale.153  
Similarly, redistribution prompted by discrete misfortunes 
that were plainly out of the control of the victim will garner 
more political support than redistribution prompted by chronic 
need or an abstract concern with the state of the Gini coeffi-
cient.154 An obvious example is disaster relief. Although such 
relief presents well-known moral hazard concerns,155 it may 
also achieve increments of redistribution that are unlikely to be 
replicated through (or undone by) tax-and-transfer.  
                                                                                       
 151. See Steven Kelman, A Case for In-Kind Transfers, 2 ECON. & PHIL. 55, 
57 (1986) (suggesting that the decision to provide assistance is unlikely to be 
independent of the choice about how to provide it); Hylland & Zeckhauser, 
supra note 63, at 282–83 (discussing the possibility that “elimination of direct 
transfer programs would have relatively little impact on the progressivity of 
the tax system and on balance would harm the poor,” as well as the converse 
possibility).  
 152. See Kelman, supra note 151, at 62 (“It is from the right to life and the 
right to be spared from living in degrading circumstances that justifications 
for rights to health care and to a minimum standard of living can be devel-
oped.”); Hylland & Zeckhauser, supra note 63, at 282–83 (noting that people 
may be “more ‘goods egalitarians’ than ‘income egalitarians’”). 
 153. See Kelman, supra note 151, at 63 (“[W]hat would be the impact of a 
decision to move from provision of health care or food stamps to provision of 
their cash equivalent? Simply put, such a decision would destroy the justifica-
tion for the policy in the first place.”). 
 154. Id. at 69 (observing that preferences for helping disadvantaged people 
are sensitive to “the context in which the issue is presented” and that “pre-
senting the problem of the disadvantaged in a multiplicity of contexts, tied to 
specific problems they face, will tend to increase the willingness of the non-
disadvantaged to help, compared to a situation where the problem is present-
ed in a single abstract context”); see also Hylland & Zeckhauser, supra note 63, 
at 282–83. 
 155. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Incentives and Government Relief for Risk, 4 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 167 (1991); Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Concep-
tual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 161, 176–84. (2003). Interest-
ingly, the rhetoric of disaster was used during the Depression to galvanize 
support for social insurance. See Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and 
“Natural” Disaster Relief: Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 257 (1999).   
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2. Punishment Preferences 
Fairness preferences include preferences for the punish-
ment of wrongdoers, what an experimental literature calls “al-
truistic punishment.”156 Humans are willing to incur costs to 
make sure that the punishment of wrongdoers occurs even 
when it can create no possible strategic gain for the individual, 
other than satisfying the revealed preference for punishment. 
Indeed, people are willing to incur these costs even when they 
were not the victim of the transgression. Thus, fairness prefer-
ences demand that people who wrongly gain at the expense of 
others should suffer a loss. 
We will go a step further than the experiments and conjec-
ture that if people will pay to punish (real or perceived) wrong-
doing, despite the fact that it will not improve their payoffs, 
they would also incur costs to prevent the wrongdoing, even if it 
will not improve their payoffs. That premise reveals another 
way that the mode of distribution affects the quantity of distri-
bution: people might choose to bear the cost of living in a world 
with suboptimal (in their view) levels of redistribution in order 
to avoid a particularly despised form of redistributive leakage—
that in favor of a recipient who is cheating the system.  
Imagine a taxpayer choosing between two redistributive 
policies: policy A, which takes the form of a tax-and-transfer 
program, and policy B, which is a redistributive legal rule. Both 
schemes have “leakage” that takes the form of distributing in-
come towards the wrong people—the non-poor, say, when the 
appropriate targets are only the poor. In equilibrium, policy A 
mis-targets to one person out of 100 per time period and appro-
priately provides assistance to the other 99 targets. In equilib-
rium, policy B mis-targets to ten people out of 100 per time pe-
riod and appropriately provides the same level of assistance to 
the other 90 targets. It would seem that policy A strictly domi-
                                                                                       
 156. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Human Altruism—Proximate Pat-
terns and Evolutionary Origins, 27 ANALYSE & KRITIK 6, 8 (2005) (“The ulti-
matum game . . . nicely illustrates that a sizeable number of people from a 
wide variety of cultures facing high monetary stakes are willing to hurt others 
to . . . punish unfair behaviour.” (internal citations omitted)). Newer experi-
ments confirm this result when the potential punisher was not himself a vic-
tim of the wrongdoing. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Third-Party Pun-
ishment and Social Norms, 25 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 63 (2004); Joseph 
Henrich et al., Costly Punishment Across Human Societies, 312 SCIENCE 1767 
(2006); see also Dominique J.-F. de Quervain et al., The Neural Basis of Altru-
istic Punishment, 305 SCIENCE 1254 (2004) (reporting that neural images of 
subjects undergoing a punishment experiment reveal that effective punish-
ment of norm violators activates a reward center in the brain). 
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nates policy B. But suppose that for A the one inappropriate 
recipient is a cheat, someone who makes himself eligible by 
fraud, and it is impossible (given the costs) to eliminate the 1% 
fraud. For policy B, the wrong targets are not cheats; they are 
the passive beneficiaries of an inefficient legal rule or program 
that haphazardly distributes in the wrong direction 10% of the 
time.  
Anyone might still regard policy B as superior if the sus-
ceptibility of policy A to intentional wrongdoing means that the 
cheating rate would or might increase over time. But let us 
suppose that these numbers represent deterrent equilibria with 
steady state leakage rates of 1% and 10%, respectively. Without 
punitive preferences, it is now obvious that citizens would pick 
policy A over policy B. With punitive preferences, however, they 
might anticipate more disutility from policy A if they know that 
unpunished and effectively unpunishable cheats will exploit it, 
and therefore prefer policy B.157 Indeed, if we consider the wel-
fare losses to citizens with these punitive preferences, policy A’s 
redistribution might represent a net loss in welfare, even 
though it would represent a net gain if these preferences did 
not exist. As a result, voters who are unwilling to adopt policy 
A may be willing to adopt policy B. It may, therefore, be politi-
cally possible to redistribute more through policy B than 
through policy A.  
By offering this example, we do not mean to argue that tax-
and-transfer is always or inherently more prone to cheating (or 
perceived cheating) than redistributive legal rules. Legal rules 
can also be abused by wrongdoing claimants. Our only point is 
that there is no reason to assume that the political action costs 
associated with cheating are exactly equal across all policies, 
nor that they always favor the mechanism of tax-and-transfer. 
In at least some contexts, the more efficient form of redistribu-
tion, judged by the total quantity of leakage, may also be more 
politically objectionable due to the quality of that leakage. If 
one form of distribution offends fairness preferences more, 
there may still be room for more of the distribution that offends 
them less.  
                                                                                       
 157. A closely related point is that equivalent behavioral distortions may 
generate differential amounts of disutility among those observing the distor-
tion. Thus, even if we accept the argument that legal rules distort the labor-
leisure choice just as much as direct transfers, non-recipients who observe 
recipients electing leisure over labor may feel far more outraged when the 
transfers are provided on a stand-alone basis, rather than as an accompani-
ment to, say, a tort judgment following an injury.  
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3. Fair Bundles 
This discussion has mostly focused on the role of fairness 
perceptions in constructing the preferences that are inputs into 
political action—the “decision-influencing” phase of political 
action costs. But fairness considerations can also affect the 
search or “opportunity spotting” phase as well. Interactions in 
which low-income individuals have been wronged or disadvan-
taged by others present natural opportunities to address distri-
bution in a manner consonant with fairness intuitions. Offering 
transfer payments for a defensible reason sounding in fairness 
(e.g., corrective justice) is politically different, and (we argue) 
easier, than offering transfer payments for no reason other 
than a net gain in social welfare.158  
Recall the Landfill example, where one option is to tie the 
siting of a landfill with benefits that go to the neighborhood 
where the landfill is placed. We introduced the example to de-
scribe the importance of framing, but it may also work because 
voters more readily perceive the compensatory bundle as fair 
than they would perceive a general system of tax-and-transfer 
that might have the same distributive result for the neighbor-
hood. The same logic lies behind Trade Adjustment Assistance 
programs, where Congress attempts to set up job training pro-
grams and other benefits targeted to the individuals who lose 
employment as a result of a free trade agreement.159 One could 
again rely on a general system of tax-and-transfer, but the pub-
lic is likely to perceive the redistribution as more fair when 
paired with a specific burden. Our point is not that a deontolog-
ical theory of corrective justice justifies the distributive benefit 
(it may or may not), but rather that the public perception of 
corrective justice eases the political path for providing that 
benefit. 
This general point is even more apparent if we shift to a 
context where there is no direct analogue to a centralized tax-
and-transfer mechanism. Consider, for example, the question of 
how the burdens of carbon reduction should be allocated among 
countries, given that some developed earlier than others and 
some are wealthier than others. In a recent book, Eric Posner 
                                                                                       
 158. The reason for the payment may also affect how it is valued by the 
recipient. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 33, at 357–58. 
 159. See Eleanor Roberts Lewis & Harry J. Connolly, Jr., Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance for Firms and Industries, 10 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 579 
(1988); Frank H. Morgan & Helen Wong, Trade Adjustment Assistance Cases: 
2007 Developments, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 99 (2008).  
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and David Weisbach argue that the desire to help poor coun-
tries (which they endorse) should be kept conceptually separate 
from questions of what to do about carbon reduction.160 They do 
not rule out the possibility that a climate change treaty could 
turn out to be a desirable redistributive vehicle, deeming it an 
empirical question.161 However, they make clear that any such 
redistributive approach must prove its merits as a redistribu-
tive vehicle when compared against other possible redistribu-
tive methods.162 
But other possible redistributive methods remain nothing 
more than theoretical abstractions until they are reduced to 
real-world mechanisms that are under the control of some deci-
sionmaker with the authority and desire to actually make the 
transfer.163 Setting up such a redistributive channel involves 
large political action costs. Finding a decisionmaker with both 
the power and the preferences to get the job done is made all 
the more difficult if the job in question is defined as a stand-
alone act of redistribution (essentially, an act of charity), rather 
than representing elements of something else—like ability-to-
pay adjusted contributions to a common goal, or a squaring-up 
of past injustices. If decisionmakers are already coming togeth-
er to create a treaty aimed at substantive objectives, especially 
ones that have significant distributive implications, then the 
ready-made channel this provides for carrying out distributive 
objectives should be explored, not rejected out of hand until it  
can prove its superiority to all other potential methods of redis-
tribution.  
In sum, the costs of finding an appropriate mechanism for 
accomplishing redistribution argues for bundling together ra-
ther than separating distributive goals and other substantive 
                                                                                       
 160. ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 73 
(2010) (arguing that any claims that wealthy countries should bear a larger 
responsibility “improperly tie valid concerns about redistribution to the prob-
lem of reducing the effects of climate change”). Separately, they reject a cor-
rective justice rationale for burdening the developed countries more heavily. 
See id. at 99–118.  
 161. See id. at 117 (viewing it as “conceivable (but unlikely) that a climate 
treaty could turn out to be a good way to redistribute wealth”).  
 162. See id. at 75, 80–96, 176–78 (specifying the empirical findings that 
would be required to support such a redistributive approach).  
 163. Adler and Posner recognize just this point in their work on cost-
benefit analysis. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 12, at 144 (observing that 
even though it might be better to pair an efficient siting decision with a trans-
fer payment, “[w]e know of no agency in the U.S. government that has the 
authority to order wealth transfers, and there are many good reasons for deny-
ing agencies this authority”). 
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goals, especially where doing so will enable the leveraging of 
fairness intuitions to support the distributive move (whether or 
not those intuitions would survive philosophical scrutiny). 
Here, as elsewhere, any savings on political action costs and 
uniquely achievable distributive gains must be weighed against 
efficiency losses that may come from using a particular redis-
tributive vehicle. But attention to political action costs offers 
reasons for investing in making the calculation.  
4. A Note About Domain 
A possible objection to our focus on the role of fairness in 
constructing political action costs is that we have shifted our 
attention outside of the proper domain of “redistribution” in 
which prescriptive tax superiority holds. K&S explicitly state 
that they are limiting their discussion to “the overall distribu-
tion of income or wealth, not entitlement to payment based on 
desert.”164 Perhaps one would say that if there is a strong pub-
lic view about the fairness of a particular legal rule or distribu-
tion, then we are no longer in the domain to which simple in-
come redistribution applies. 
Yet there is no way to cleanly separate income distribution 
from matters of individual desert. Consider first a legal rule 
that might seem to sit clearly outside of the domain of redistri-
bution: a ban on racial discrimination in employment. The de-
sert-based justification for protecting individuals from discrim-
ination does not explain why civil rights laws forbid only some 
parties to discriminate and not others: employers but not em-
ployees;165 public accommodations but not customers;166 land-
lords but not homeseekers.167 There are many reasons why we 
                                                                                       
 164. Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 667 n.2. 
 165. For example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(2012), prohibits employers from discriminating against employees in various 
ways, but not employees from discriminating against employers. 
 166. Public accommodations are prohibited from discriminating against 
customers on the basis of race, but customers are not banned from discrimi-
nating on the basis of race against the owners or managers of public accom-
modations. See Michael Blake, The Discriminating Shopper, 43 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1017 (2006); Katharine T. Bartlett & G. Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by 
Customers (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2015-4, 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540334. 
 167. See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1531 (7th Cir. 
1990) (“[C]ustomer preference, in this [Fair Housing Act] setting, is a nonin-
vidious reason—a reason not forbidden by the statute—because the statute is 
for the protection of customers.”). But see Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for 
Fair Housing (unpublished manuscript, on file with author, 2015) (reexamin-
ing the assumption that fair housing laws do not reach homeseekers).   
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might see these patterns, but one possibility might be to beat 
back forms of discrimination that are especially damaging to 
one’s income or wealth. If so, we might understand bans on ra-
cial discrimination (and discrimination on other protected 
grounds) as non-tax rules that in fact address important 
sources of income inequality.168 Yet because these laws align 
with the public preference against the unfairness of discrimina-
tion, they are more politically feasible than achieving the same 
result via tax-and-transfer.  
On the other end of the spectrum, programs that seem 
clearly redistributive, like the EITC, food stamps, and Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), involve a strong 
element of desert. Consider the work requirements that helped 
make TANF and the EITC politically acceptable and the exclu-
sion of felony drug offenders from even the food stamp pro-
gram.169 If “entitlement[s] to payment based on desert” can be 
understood broadly enough to reach even the actual welfare 
programs that exist in the world, then virtually no redistribu-
tive legal rules would fall entirely within the distributive do-
main. One could then concede the principle of prescriptive tax 
superiority but avoid it in every case of interest. 
This is plainly not what proponents of tax superiority have 
in mind. Indeed, K&S themselves appear to contemplate the 
domain of tax superiority reaching into areas like tort and con-
tract law to preclude distribution-sensitive divergences from 
efficiency,170 even though those fields also embed desert-based 
notions. Yet K&S presumably would not want to replace every 
                                                                                       
 168. See Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 31, at 14–18 (arguing that doc-
trinal bans on private race discrimination address distributional issues better 
than race-sensitive taxes); id. at 18–21 (arguing that doctrinal bans on racial 
profiling by police address distributional issues more cheaply than tax). For 
evidence that civil rights laws increased income for African Americans, see 
James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal 
Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South 
Carolina, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 138 (1989); John J. Donohue III & James J. 
Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights 
Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 1603 (1991). See also 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 953–85 (2003) (arguing that the ADA can be un-
derstood as welfare reform and suggesting that this characterization could 
explain doctrinal restrictions in the case law).    
 169. See 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2012) (making those convicted of certain drug 
felonies ineligible for various forms of assistance, including nutritional assis-
tance, subject to state opt-outs); Turner v. Glickman, 207 F.3d 419 (7th Cir. 
2000) (upholding this provision against constitutional challenges). 
 170. See Markovits, supra note 5, at 565–66 (noting this point).  
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law’s distributive incidence with tax-and-transfer. Antidiscrim-
ination law provides an especially compelling example,171 but 
similar points might be made about, say, compensation re-
quirements in tort and property that have distributive effects 
even as they respond to wrongs.172 
To be sure, cabining off certain domains as too desert-
infused to count as redistribution might help to prop up the in-
variance hypothesis (through the simple expedient of removing 
from the analysis a set of distributive changes that we would 
not expect to see replicated or countered through tax law). But 
if welfare is the goal, all distributive changes count, whether 
delivered through nominally redistributive measures or other-
wise. Here, as elsewhere, the presence of positive political ac-
tion costs introduces the possibility that one redistributive  
route will be more successful than another, producing distribu-
tive variance. 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSITIVE POLITICAL 
ACTION COSTS   
Positive political action costs, like positive transaction 
costs, radically change the operating environment for maximiz-
ing welfare. Just as positive transaction costs introduce the 
possibility of divergence between the existing allocation of re-
                                                                                       
 171. Economics does not have a clear agreement on the normative justifica-
tion for the ban on race discrimination. Richard Epstein famously argued 
against the prohibition on race discrimination in employment, partly from an 
economic perspective. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE 
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). For efforts to jus-
tify such laws within economics, see John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus 
Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583 
(1992) (reviewing Epstein’s book); Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Con-
flict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995).  
 172. The response might be that these other laws have an impetus other 
than altering distribution; they are responding to a wrong first and foremost, 
and only incidentally affecting distribution. But on further examination, many 
compensation requirements (like those associated with the Takings Clause, or 
with tort liability) can be recast as forms of social insurance. See, e.g., Richard 
A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645 
(1985); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michel-
man: Comments on Economic Interpretations of “Just Compensation” Law, 17 
J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988). Redistribution is of course often cast in exactly 
these terms as well. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: 
Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283 (1981). Conversely, many 
redistributive measures are prompted not by income statistics or Gini coeffi-
cients but by discrete events that have unfairly impacted their victims—if not 
“wrongs” as such, then at least identifiable misfortunes. See Landis, supra 
note 155.  
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sources and the efficient allocation, positive political action 
costs introduce the possibility of divergence between the exist-
ing distributive results and those that would maximize wel-
fare.173 This possibility follows as a matter of logic from the fact 
that different distributive results are possible depending on 
how redistribution is carried out—that is, from the failure of 
the invariance hypothesis. And, importantly, the point holds 
regardless of whether one believes that current levels of redis-
tribution undershoot or overshoot the welfare-maximizing lev-
el. By analogy, one need not take a stand on whether polluting 
factories or polluted-upon homeowners should receive more or 
fewer entitlements in the world in order to believe that trans-
action costs can interfere with efficiency. Our point is equally 
fundamental: in the presence of positive political action costs, 
we cannot wave away the possibility that our political system 
will fail to achieve welfare-maximizing distributive results.174  
In this Part, we first examine the parallel between political 
action costs and transaction costs. Second, we explore the case 
for doctrinal redistribution. In these two sections we raise and 
respond to some possible objections to our analysis. In the third 
section, we offer some directions for future research into politi-
cal action costs. 
                                                                                       
 173. Of course, different actors and entities will have different views about 
what constitutes distributive optimality. For concreteness, and not by way of 
limitation, it may be helpful to think of society possessing a social welfare 
function that tracks the distributive preferences of the median voter or citi-
zen—although much evidence suggests citizens don’t know the actual distribu-
tion of their nation. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. Welfare maxi-
mization might also be assessed based on a social welfare function derived 
from exogenously selected principles. Our point here is very general: for any 
given social welfare function, there may be a divergence between the distribu-
tion that would maximize welfare and the distribution the political system 
actually produces.  
 174. The analogy we draw between the Coase Theorem and the problem of 
political action costs is not original to us. See Daron Acemoglu, Why Not a Po-
litical Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP. 
ECON. 620 (2003). Acemoglu argues that societies pursue inefficient policies 
due to certain kinds of transaction costs inherent to the political realm, includ-
ing the inability to bind future decisionmakers. These costs explain why a 
society capable of achieving redistribution in a less efficient way could not 
simply bargain to have that same increment of redistribution handled through 
the tax system. See also Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, supra note 36, at 177 (questioning why bargaining would not pro-
duce redistribution through the most efficient means and suggesting that 
those urging non-tax redistribution must rule out this possibility). 
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A. THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL ACTION COSTS 
We can begin, in Coasean fashion, by examining the sort of 
invariant distributive results we would get if political action 
costs were zero. In this world, it matters not at all how legal 
rules and institutional arrangements affect distribution, be-
cause a costless redistributive mechanism will instantly and 
perfectly correct any distributive infelicities. No one concerned 
with distribution would have any incentive to attempt to ac-
complish distributive goals through means other than the cost-
less tax-and-transfer system, for all the reasons that K&S and 
others have detailed. First, it would introduce distortions, and 
second, it would be ineffective in changing the distributive pic-
ture because Congress (or whatever fanciful body would make 
decisions in a world of zero political action costs) could  
costlessly offset it.  
Indeed, K&S’s result of formal tax superiority is a purely 
conceptual demonstration analogous to that undertaken by 
Coase: for any quantum of redistribution that might be accom-
plished through legal rules, there exists (in theory) a tax-and-
transfer method that would be superior.175 This is analogous to 
saying that for any quantum of government coercion that might 
be used to place resources in the hands of a higher valuer, there 
exists (in theory) a private bargain that would be a better way 
to accomplish that shift. Just as we do not derive from the 
Coase Theorem a general principle of “transaction superiority” 
(given transaction costs), we cannot derive from K&S’s demon-
stration any general prescriptive principle of “tax superiority” 
(given political action costs). Instead, Coase’s work was de-
signed to focus attention on the existence of transaction 
costs.176 The K&S demonstration should likewise turn our at-
                                                                                       
 175. See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 669 (“[A]ny 
regime with an inefficient legal rule can be replaced by a regime with an effi-
cient legal rule and a modified income tax system designed so every person is 
made better off.”). In addition, in later solo work, Kaplow has expressly char-
acterized an analysis of externality control that employs the premise of dis-
tributive neutrality as a theoretical exercise rather than a basis for policy. See 
Kaplow, Externalities, supra note 74, at 489, 503; see also Christopher Curran, 
Optimal Techniques of Redistribution, in VI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 301, 309 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (describ-
ing the work of K&S and others as “compris[ing] an existence theorem—if 
society decides to redistribute income, there exists a tax schedule for redis-
tributing income that everyone prefers to any other way of redistributing in-
come, including the use of legal rules or institutions”).  
 176. See COASE, supra note 2, at 13 (“I examined what would happen in a 
world in which transaction costs were assumed to be zero . . . . not to describe 
what life would be like in such a world but to provide a simple setting in which 
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tention to political action costs, not divert attention away from 
them with conjectures and assumptions.  
1. Beyond Tautology 
One argument for ignoring political action costs might be 
that they are simply inputs into, or artifacts of, the prevailing 
political equilibrium. On this account, they could not stand in 
the way of maximizing social welfare because they are part of 
what determines the shape of the social welfare function itself, 
and a background constraint against which its maximization 
plays out.177 Suppose, for example, that distributive patterns 
become vastly less egalitarian following changes in earning 
patterns that are not counteracted to any significant degree by 
changes in the tax system.178 This distributive result might be 
interpreted not as the product of a political impediment to the 
achievement of some stable preexisting social welfare function, 
but rather as the welfare-maximizing outcome under the new 
political equilibrium produced by these new earning patterns. 
So whatever the distribution was in 1990 was just the distribu-
tion that political equilibrium then allowed. Whatever the dis-
tribution is in 2015 is just what the political equilibrium now 
allows.  
Significantly, however, our analysis suggests that there is 
no unique distributive outcome that the political system pro-
duces under a given set of conditions; rather, political action 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
to develop the analysis and, what was even more important, to make clear the 
fundamental role which transaction costs do, and should, play in the fashion-
ing of the institutions which make up the economic system.”).  
 177. An analogous point has appeared in the transaction costs literature: 
transaction costs can never interfere with efficiency because they are simply 
additional constraints, like the costs of transportation or technological limits, 
that form the background conditions under which optimization takes place. 
See Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 
YALE L.J. 1211, 1212, 1218–19 (1991); Harold Demsetz, The Problem of Social 
Cost: What Problem? A Critique of the Reasoning of A.C. Pigou and R.H. 
Coase, 7 REV. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2011). If a transaction would cost too much, it is 
efficient that it not occur, just as a shipment should not occur if it costs more 
than it is worth. See Demsetz, supra. This might seem to suggest a tautology 
that always treats the status quo as optimal. See Dahlman, supra note 92, at 
153–54. See generally E.J. Mishan, Pangloss on Pollution, 73 SWEDISH J. 
ECON. 113 (1971). But when costs are amenable to cost-effective reduction or 
elimination through changes in legal rules or institutions they are an appro-
priate focus of attention for law and economics scholars. See Calabresi, supra, 
at 1231–35; Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1471, 1481–82 (2013). This is true of political action costs no less than 
transaction costs.  
 178. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.  
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costs are variable and malleable across methods and modes of 
distribution. Just as transaction costs can be higher or lower 
depending on institutional design, the political action costs of 
achieving a given distributive result can be higher or lower de-
pending on the route employed. Those differences in political 
action costs translate into differences in achievable distributive 
results, with implications for social welfare. Of course, one 
might attempt to define social welfare in a way that tautologi-
cally equates its maximization with whatever distributive re-
sults are actually obtained through one’s preferred distributive 
route.179 Accepting this tautology would effectively foreclose 
distributive considerations altogether, without quite saying one 
is doing so. This, we think, is an insupportable position for a 
welfarist to take.  
Confronting distributive variance admittedly introduces 
many complications—starting with the contested question of 
what social welfare function to maximize. The invariance hy-
pothesis, if true, would make such inquiries unnecessary. Com-
paring the welfare generated by two (or more) different distrib-
utive results is obviously a much less tractable task than 
simply examining which of two routes to an invariant distribu-
tive result is less costly. Yet because invariance cannot be made 
true without resort to tautology, it cannot be invoked to push 
distributive considerations out of the welfarist analysis of legal 
rules and policies. Law and economics scholars should not, of 
course, feel compelled to take up distributive questions if they 
would prefer to focus solely on questions of economic efficiency. 
But they should be clear about what they are—and are not—
doing.  
2. Communicating and Collaborating 
Consistent with the discussion above, we propose a change 
in the way that law and economics speaks to those who care 
about distribution and who believe that our current distributive 
pattern diverges from what would maximize welfare. Currently 
                                                                                       
 179. Alternatively, one might take the position that social welfare is always 
maximized regardless of which distributive route is taken and which distribu-
tive result is reached. Here, the choice of route might itself be viewed as just 
another input into the political equilibrium that generates the relevant social 
welfare function. We do not dispute that redistributive efforts can have the 
effect of altering the political equilibrium. See Markovits, supra note 5, at 
600–01; McDonnell, supra note 5, at 111. What we are questioning is whether 
any realistic social welfare function can be understood to be satisfied regard-
less of which political equilibrium obtains and which distributive outcome is 
produced.  
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the standard message transmitted from law and economics is 
this: 
 
  Standard Message. You care about distribution? Hey, 
we care about distribution too! We’re welfarists and we 
fully recognize that maximizing social welfare requires 
getting distribution right. But we want to make sure 
that we redistribute in the least costly way. Otherwise, 
you might think you are helping some group, say the 
poor, but you are really hurting them by redistributing 
in an inefficient way. Making legal rules sensitive to 
distribution is a very expensive way to redistribute be-
cause it adds unnecessary behavioral distortions. There 
is a better way. Tax-and-transfer will get you to your 
distributive goal (whatever it may be) more cheaply 
than whatever other plan you may have in mind. The 
pie can be bigger, and everyone can have a bigger slice.  
 
Standard Message sounds ecumenical and open to all dis-
tributive approaches. But, as we have seen, the invariance hy-
pothesis upon which it is implicitly based does not hold water. 
It can only be shored up by adopting a vision of welfare maxi-
mization that aligns with whatever moment-to-moment dis-
tributive outcome is actually produced by the political system—
a kind of Panglossian social welfare function.180 People who 
employ less tautological measures of distributive optimality 
would find it highly relevant that different distributive results 
are possible depending on the distributive method selected. 
Such individuals might well be interested in quantifying these 
distributive differences and considering how they might trade 
off against efficiency considerations. Standard Message closes 
off these lines of inquiry.  
In place of Standard Message, we argue, law and econom-
ics scholars should be sending one of the following two  
messages.  
 
  Honest Disregard. So you are raising a distributive 
issue. I think that whatever distribution our political 
equilibrium produces through the tax-and-transfer sys-
tem at any given time is probably the right one, or at 
least that we can’t do any better at that point in time. If 
                                                                                       
 180. In Voltaire’s Candide, Dr. Pangloss declared the existing state of af-
fairs to be the “best of all possible worlds.” VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 2 (Burton Raf-
fel trans., 2005).  
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you agree with that, then I can tell you categorically 
that we should focus only on efficiency in crafting legal 
rules, and just let the political process do whatever it 
does in setting tax-and-transfer policy. If you have some 
other idea about what welfare maximization requires in 
terms of distribution, and you don’t trust the political 
process to get us there, then I can’t really say anything 
to you about that. My work focuses on efficiency, not dis-
tribution or politics.  
 
  Collaboration. So you are raising a distributive issue. 
There are many different views about what distribution 
we should pursue as a society, which is to say that there 
are many ways our social welfare function could be for-
mulated. But if you tell me that, based on your vision of 
welfarism, you’d like to see more (less) redistribution in 
favor of the poor, there are a couple things I can say 
about that. Right off the bat, there is always an ad-
vantage to a tax-and-transfer system because it only 
distorts the labor-leisure decision, and doesn’t distort 
any other decisions. However, the political action re-
quired to redistribute involves costs, and it’s possible 
those costs may be greater in the tax-and-transfer realm 
under some circumstances. That could potentially tip 
the balance and cause other kinds of distributive chang-
es to dominate.  
 
The first, Honest Disregard, makes clear that the speaker 
is not interested in exploring distributive issues. Consistent 
with that position, it declines to give advice about how to 
achieve a different distribution. The second, Collaboration, 
seeks to invest intellectual effort in showing how someone with 
a particular distributive objective would go about achieving 
that goal using available legal tools. Part of the analysis would 
track the standard discussions we are critiquing, but, im-
portantly, part of the analysis would take into account the role 
of political action costs. In the spirit of Collaboration, then, 
those concerned about distribution might be told that a given 
legal rule produces change X in distribution but also causes an 
efficiency loss of Y magnitude, leaving it to those who construct 
and apply social welfare functions to assess if this is a worth-
while trade.  
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B. DOCTRINAL REDISTRIBUTION PLAUSIBLY INCREASES  
SOCIAL WELFARE 
Distributive variance opens up the possibility that a non-
tax method of redistribution that makes possible a preferred 
distributive result will advance welfare on net, despite intro-
ducing other distortions. Conversely, an efficient legal rule may 
produce an enduring distributive deficit that is more costly in 
welfare terms than a less efficient rule that generates better 
distribution. We do not claim that doctrinal redistribution will 
always, or even very frequently, dominate tax-and-transfer—
only that it may plausibly do so under some circumstances, and 
that this possibility warrants investigation. This Section exam-
ines some dimensions of that inquiry.  
1. Burdens of Proof 
A pivotal (if often unstated) premise in most debates about 
tax superiority concerns who should bear the burden of proof.181 
Our view is that the individuals who would give categorical and 
counterintuitive advice—that, outside of tax, welfarists should 
ignore the welfare effects of distribution—bear the burden of 
proving the advice is well-founded. Given the falsity of invari-
ance, that burden has not been met, at least not as a categori-
cal matter.  
At the same time, those who seek to justify particular inef-
ficient doctrines on the basis of distribution should, at a mini-
mum, bear the burden of showing that the doctrine itself plau-
sibly changes distribution in a way that is likely to produce 
welfare gains.182 This is a minimum condition for setting up the 
possibility that such welfare gains could swamp efficiency loss-
es. That further showing—that welfare gains exceed welfare 
losses—depends on how heavily different distributive results 
                                                                                       
 181. K&S have previously asserted that the burden must fall on those who 
would challenge tax superiority. See Kaplow & Shavell, Legal Rules, supra 
note 15, at 835 (“[A]lthough one or another qualification may turn out to be 
relevant in some instances, we would need to have sufficient evidence (or, at 
minimum, plausible conjectures) in order to know what, if any, adjustments to 
legal rules should be made.”); Markovits, supra note 5, at 523, 610 (noting and 
critiquing this assignment of the burden of proof).  
 182. As we have seen, the contracting-around argument suggests some 
purportedly redistributive legal rules are no such thing, and this is an excel-
lent reason not to pursue such rules (ones that stand no chance of changing 
distribution in a welfare-enhancing direction). See supra notes 34–35 and ac-
companying text. Neither proponents nor opponents of redistributive social 
policies or legal rules should be relieved of the duty to investigate their actual 
incidence.  
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are weighted within the social welfare function under consider-
ation.  
The net effect on welfare also depends on the extent to 
which distributive changes achieved doctrinally will be coun-
termanded by other legal actors or will merely duplicate results 
that would have otherwise been achieved through tax-and-
transfer. Our discussion above rebuts the strongest version of 
this claim—complete invariance—but, as the next section ex-
plains, even partial offsetting and crowding out can remain 
costly. Here, it seems as if those debating the merits of differ-
ent forms of distribution should share the burden of investigat-
ing these dynamics.  
2. Costly Offsetting and Crowding Out 
The existence of distributive variance does not mean that 
doctrinal redistribution is never offset to any degree. Nor does 
distributive variance rule out the possibility that redistributive 
legal rules will at times partially or wholly crowd out less dis-
tortive tax-and-transfer measures. Both offsetting and crowd-
ing out can be very costly. These costs may be worth incurring, 
depending on how the final distributive and allocative results 
compare with those that would have obtained in the absence of 
the initial act of doctrinal redistribution, but they should be 
taken into account. Although we will focus in this Section on 
the possibility that Congress will offset the distributive impacts 
of court-enacted legal rules, the analysis applies more broadly 
to all sorts of offsetting that might occur as between different 
governmental actors, such as between Congress and a state leg-
islature, between two different courts, between a court and an 
administrative agency, or between two different administrative 
agencies.  
As an initial matter, it bears emphasis that offsetting may 
be entirely absent in some settings. It may simply be implausi-
ble that certain narrow legal rules or local policies will attract 
distributive countermands from anyone. Similarly, when an 
actor’s opportunities to redistribute are sufficiently limited, she 
may be able to take advantage of all of those opportunities 
without ever producing the sort of aggregate distributive blip 
necessary to attract political attention or galvanize a counter-
mand. In other words, as we discussed above, the Margin of 
Inaction (MOI) may be larger than the full set of plausible re-
distributive opportunities. Legal actors such as courts may also 
be confronted with circumstances in which it appears unlikely 
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that making a distributive improvement or avoiding a distribu-
tive deficit will crowd out similar moves by Congress. In these 
cases, the welfarist advice might well be the opposite of that 
given by K&S: instead of always ignoring distribution, these 
actors should always take it into account in their decisionmak-
ing.183  
Significantly, the MOI is a double-edged sword that can al-
so keep Congress from making welfare-advancing corrective 
distributive offsets. Thus welfarist courts may decline to adopt 
distributively harmful efficient legal rules when they predict 
that Congress would be unlikely to provide a correction.184 
Moreover, the effective MOI encountered by a court could grow 
if background social and economic factors move distribution in, 
say, an even more inegalitarian direction than Congress itself 
would prefer.185 Under some social and economic conditions, 
courts may be in a position to both respond to inegalitarian 
shifts that fly under Congress’s radar and (if the court’s prefer-
ences are yet more egalitarian than Congress’s) to overcorrect 
for them to an extent that Congress will not counteract.186  
Things become more complicated if the power of courts to 
effect welfare-enhancing distributive changes outstrips the 
MOI; in this case, taking every opportunity to move distribu-
                                                                                       
 183. This assumes there are not other institutional or process reasons to 
keep redistribution out of the hands of courts. See infra Part III.B.3.  
 184. It is noteworthy that courts have at times been deemed especially 
well-suited to assess the political power of the litigants and the likelihood that 
they will be able to achieve their goals politically. See, e.g., United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (posing the question of 
“whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”). Thus, courts may have par-
ticular institutional competence in recognizing when corrective offsetting will 
and will not occur, and in determining the circumstances under which legal 
rules can improve the position of the politically powerless without drawing 
legislative countermands. We thank Tara Grove for comments on this point.  
 185. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY (2014) (chronicling distributive shifts over time). 
 186. There is still a potential crowding out concern in these contexts—it is 
possible that if every welfarist court hewed to efficiency as the distributive 
picture got cumulatively worse that eventually Congress would react to im-
prove distribution. But it is also possible that the deteriorating distributive 
picture would be accompanied by shifts in the political equilibrium that would 
entrench the rising inequality. The result could be a sort of “ratchet effect” in 
which growing inequality begets even more inequality. See Orbach, supra note 
91, at 55 (rent-seeking causes inequality with growing effectiveness as talent 
is drawn into areas of the economy where rent-seeking is possible).  
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tion in a welfare-enhancing direction will cause some or all 
such efforts to be counteracted by Congress.187  
Such offsetting can be quite costly. Aside from the re-
sources consumed in carrying out move and countermove, the 
net effect is to leave in place distortionary legal rules that no 
longer produce countervailing distributive gains. Offsets may 
also produce objectionable distributive effects within income 
classes. A doctrinal legal rule that aspires to improve distribu-
tion will primarily benefit the particular low-income people 
who happen to be involved in particular transactions, activities, 
or legal disputes, not poor people in general.188 But a tax-and-
transfer offset that applies broadly across income classes will 
not surgically undo the attempted distributive improvement; 
rather, it will undo it on average for the income class. In this 
scenario, every gain for a low-income individual who benefits 
from an (ostensibly) redistributive legal rule translates into a 
direct loss for other low-income individuals who did not happen 
to benefit from the redistributive legal rule.189  
Yet the fact that costly offsetting can occur hardly proves 
that the right amount of redistribution for welfarist courts to 
pursue is zero. If additional redistribution would enhance wel-
fare, one wants to redistribute as much as the MOI allows, but 
                                                                                       
 187. An interesting question is what happens when the MOI is exceeded. 
One possibility is that the marginal judicial decision that increases redistribu-
tion beyond the MOI acts as a tipping point, causing Congress to undo the 
distributive effects of that and all prior judicial decisions moving distribution 
beyond Congress’s preferred point. Alternatively, Congress may engage in 
partial offsetting by targeting the largest or most salient changes, while leav-
ing some sub-MOI redistribution intact. It is also quite unclear whether and 
how the individual actions of different courts might aggregate to prompt con-
gressional action, especially given the possibility that different decisions may 
have offsetting or synergistic distributive effects.  
 188. This is the haphazardness objection. See supra notes 36, 38–40 and 
accompanying text.  
 189. The normative valence of such a distributive result depends on the 
extent to which income serves as a better basis for welfare-improving redistri-
bution than the trigger condition for benefiting from the legal rule. There is 
also a converse scenario that must be considered alongside the one in the text. 
Suppose a court chooses an efficient rule with bad distributive results for 
those who happen to be engaged in particular interactions. If Congress then 
engages in a corrective offset using tax-and-transfer, it will make everyone in 
the income class better off but will leave those who suffered distributive losses 
in the particular interaction relatively worse off. In other words, this particu-
lar drawback of offsetting—that it alters the intra-class distribution—applies 
whether we are talking about offsetting of aspirational changes (which would 
not be necessary if we followed K&S’s advice) or corrective offsetting of un-
wanted distributive effects of newly adopted, efficient rules (which would be 
required if we followed K&S’s advice).  
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no more. Similarly, welfarist courts would want to stop redis-
tributing before their efforts start to crowd out measures that 
Congress would otherwise enact (at lower distortionary cost).190 
To the extent that Congress reacts to aggregations of distribu-
tive changes, courts may face an interesting collective action 
problem. Their success in resolving it depends not only on their 
ability to coordinate, but also on their ability to gauge how close 
they are to inducing Congress to alter the progressivity of the 
income tax. Although the question is an empirical one, the idea 
that judges are capable of such discernment is not implausible. 
Strategic theories of statutory interpretation are premised on 
the analogous idea that judges understand how far an interpre-
tation of a statute can diverge from what the current legisla-
ture wants.191 
3. Alternative Objections: Institutional and Process Concerns 
The fact that invariance is false means that multiple dis-
tributive equilibria are possible within our political system. 
This result raises questions—ones that are suppressed when 
invariance is assumed—about whether there are reasons to 
prefer one redistributive institution or process over another, 
independent of the merits of the distributive outcome itself and 
the distortions associated with it. To a large degree, these ques-
tions fall outside the scope of this Article. Our primary purpose 
is to highlight and criticize the invariance assumption that has 
played such a large and unacknowledged role in the way legal 
economists treat distributional issues. Thus, even if institu-
tional or process considerations weigh against doctrinal redis-
tribution, that does not justify using the existing analysis to 
support tax superiority. Nonetheless, we will briefly consider 
how such considerations might affect the welfare analysis.  
First, perhaps there is a normative objection to engaging in 
redistribution through institutions other than the legislature. 
At one point K&S come close to claiming that the legislature is 
institutionally superior, compared to courts, for effecting redis-
tribution in a democracy.192 Such a claim has real bite when 
                                                                                       
 190. The costs of crowding out follow from K&S’s extra distortion argu-
ment; one is substituting a more distortionary process for a less distortionary 
one. Consequently, the degree of harm caused by crowding out depends on the 
validity of the extra distortion argument itself. See supra notes 26–28 and 
accompanying text.  
 191. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  
 192. See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 675; see also 
Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 36, at 
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institutional variance exists, because different institutional ac-
tors are capable of delivering different distributive outcomes. A 
welfarist would presumably approach the question by consider-
ing both the content of the distributive result available through 
each alternative avenue and the welfare implications of using 
that particular avenue—whether administrative costs, costs 
relating to preferences of the citizenry for particular processes, 
or otherwise. This calls for comparative institutional analysis 
capable of capturing all the differences between the distributive 
routes. We see nothing obvious about the result of this analysis.  
Specifically, we do not see why a theorist would categori-
cally endorse courts, for example, to conduct efficiency analysis, 
but categorically object on welfare grounds to their conducting 
distributive analysis. Efficiency analysis is just as complex and 
contested as distributive analysis, and most judges lack formal 
economic training.193 Moreover, a court’s single-minded pursuit 
of efficiency in a situated legal context is subject to second-best 
critiques that seem at least as significant as those that might 
arise from its efforts to pursue both efficiency and distribution 
in that same context.194 Finally, even if a welfarist were to rule 
out redistribution by courts based on such considerations, other 
non-tax alternatives would remain open, such as redistributive 
legal rules enacted by legislatures.  
A second objection might be that the doctrinal redistribu-
tion is inherently (or at least typically) lacking in transparency. 
Perhaps the reason for variance is only that the public will fail 
to recognize some forms of redistribution for what they are and 
perhaps tax progressivity has the virtue of making redistribu-
tion plain and visible. Our discussion of salience and framing 
might imply that we favor redistributive methods that trick the 
public into providing support. To be sure, there are difficult 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
176 (suggesting, in contesting distributionally weighted cost-benefit analysis, 
that “[t]he normal course for Western democracies is for elected legislatures to 
be allocated the power to make the primary distributive judgments”). 
 193. Interestingly, law and economics has not always viewed courts as es-
pecially well-suited to perform economic analysis. See NEIL DUXBURY, PAT-
TERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 323 (1995) (“Most early proponents of 
law and economics were insistent that the legislature alone was the appropri-
ate forum for formulating and implementing economic policy.”); id. at 324 
(“[I]n much of this [early law and economics] literature we encounter a deep 
distrust of the perceived economic perspective of the courts, and a gargantuan 
faith in the economic good sense of the legislature.”).  
 194. See R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 
24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best Theory and 
Law & Economics: An Introduction, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1998). 
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normative questions that attend any discussion about shaping 
public perceptions surrounding redistribution (or efficiency, for 
that matter). For one thing, failures of transparency can back-
fire, heightening political action costs or producing other direct 
welfare losses—losses that must be balanced against  
whatever expected distributive gains might thereby be 
achieved.195 Again, however, we see nothing obvious about how 
a welfarist analysis would treat these issues.  
Significantly, there is no natural “manipulation-free” base-
line that obviously and uncontroversially reveals the full truth 
of a distributive situation.196 One might say that framing redis-
tribution to highlight features like shared contributions to a 
common goal, reciprocal social insurance, the bundling of costs 
and benefits, or the correction of unfair background conditions 
is a “manipulation.” But the same might be said of a system 
that delivers pre-tax earnings to individuals without making 
transparent the ways in which the earning of that income is 
itself dependent on public expenditures,197 or of a tax code that 
embeds numerous tax breaks that would look offensive to fair-
ness if cast as direct welfare payments.198 If tax subsidies for 
parents of young children are the economic equivalent of tax 
penalties for the childless, yet the former is politically feasible 
while the latter is not, which policy is manipulative and which 
is transparent?199  
                                                                                       
 195. See Yew-Kwang Ng, The Optimal Size of Public Spending and the 
Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 253, 257 (2000) (“While we 
may try to do good by stealth in the short run and proceed to use distribution-
al weights, in the long run this will be known and cause disincentive effects.”). 
On the other hand, overt redistributive efforts carry the risk that their very 
explicitness will lead to political malfunctions. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 131, 
at 194 (observing that a negative income tax, in which money transparently 
flows from one group to another, creates “the danger that instead of being an 
arrangement under which the great majority tax themselves willingly to help 
an unfortunate minority, it will be converted into one under which a majority 
imposes taxes for its own benefit on an unwilling minority”). Although Fried-
man viewed this danger as elevated by the fact that the approach “makes the 
process so explicit,” he concluded that one must simply “rely on the self-
restraint and goodwill of the electorate.” Id. 
 196. Cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DE-
CISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 237–38 (2008) (discussing 
the inevitability of choosing a default).  
 197. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 58; Gamage & Shanske, supra note 
131. 
 198. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.  
 199. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (presenting the related 
Schelling paradox).  
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These baseline issues are exacerbated by an underappreci-
ated feature of the principle of prescriptive tax superiority: that 
it not only directs courts and other actors to refrain from adopt-
ing doctrines that would improve distribution, it also directs 
them to undertake efficient acts that would worsen distribu-
tion.200 Yet we would not ordinarily think of a legal rule that 
merely maintained the distributive status quo as “redistribu-
tive” in nature.201 In what sense is it more transparent to gen-
erate distributive neutrality through a two-step process in 
which distribution is first worsened (offstage) and then brought 
back to baseline through an overtly redistributive process that 
attracts significant political resistance?202 As recent research 
suggests, the fact that a policy generates political resistance 
does not mean that it also generates an accurate understanding 
of the incidence of the relevant burdens.203 There is no obvious 
welfare-related reason to categorically prefer processes that 
make preferred distributive patterns maximally difficult to 
achieve and maintain.204  
                                                                                       
 200. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text (distinguishing correc-
tive invariance from aspirational invariance). 
 201. See supra note 58 (discussing the meaning of redistribution).  
 202. Experimental evidence suggests that people cannot readily aggregate 
“on stage” and “offstage” distributive elements when making normative judg-
ments. See McCaffery & Baron, supra note 134, at 1768 (“Counter to logic, the 
disaggregation bias suggests that ordinary people will have a difficult time 
accepting a steeply progressive tax system, even if it is simply to compensate 
for other relatively regressive elements of public finance that are offstage.”). 
The possibility that existing legal rules developed in ways that deliberately 
built in regressive redistribution—perhaps in part to avoid the transparency 
associated with the tax system—sharpens this point. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, 100–01 (1977) (suggest-
ing that antebellum politicians likely chose to use legal doctrine rather than 
the tax system to pursue subsidization at least in part because the former “can 
more easily disguise underlying political choices,” and noting that “the tenden-
cy of subsidy through legal change during this period was dramatically to 
throw the burden of economic development on the weakest and least active 
elements in the population”).  
 203. See Eric J. Brunner et al., Homeowners, Renters and the Political 
Economy of Property Taxation, 53 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 38, 48 (2015) 
(finding, using survey data of California homeowner and renter attitudes to-
ward sales and property taxes, “that the strong opposition among homeowners 
to the property tax is present regardless of the relative tax burden faced by the 
individual homeowner” and concluding these results are most plausibly due to 
the relatively greater salience of the property tax). Brunner et al. observe that 
“[w]hile salience is clearly associated with greater sensitivity to tax rates, such 
sensitivity is clearly no guarantee that taxpayers rationally consider their 
personal tax burden or effective tax price of public services when making 
choices concerning public service spending.” Id. at 48–49. 
 204. On the contrary, a welfarist would presumably use welfarist criteria to 
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More broadly, welfarists cannot avoid confronting the fact 
that most voters are not committed welfarists. Instead, voters 
are more likely to combine a pragmatic concern for consequenc-
es with intuitive concerns for non-consequential values like 
fairness, corrective justice, equality, and political legitimacy. 
Thus, it is not enough for a welfarist to find a policy vehicle for 
redistribution that satisfies purely welfarist criteria; a commit-
ted welfarist must also find a political vehicle that aligns or 
resonates with broadly shared forms of normative thinking to 
which the public subscribes. That linkage is what is required to 
maximize welfare. It is not clear what the welfarist objection 
could be to this approach, especially given that other popular 
beliefs—such as those regarding the connection between effort 
and economic success—already form part of the backdrop 
against which redistributive efforts play out.205  
C. FURTHER RESEARCH INTO POLITICAL ACTION COSTS 
Part II surveyed a number of reasons why political action 
costs might be positive and variable, thus falsifying the invari-
ance hypothesis. Each of the reasons for doubt about invariance 
represents an area of existing or potential research into the 
relative magnitude of political action costs, and hence the likely 
feasibility and stickiness of distributive changes. In this Sec-
tion, we will briefly consider some directions that future re-
search might take in light of the analysis above.  
1. Assessing Inputs  
Welfarists should be interested in examining the inputs in-
to the magnitude of political action costs. These factors will 
help to determine the amount of redistribution that may be 
uniquely achievable outside of the tax system. As in other con-
texts, our concern should be with identifying regularities (here, 
in mediating political resistance and acceptance) that are sys-
tematic enough to facilitate predictions about how the costs of 
political action will be affected.  
To focus on just one example, fairness perceptions and 
preferences follow discernible patterns that can be, and have 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
assess the relative merits of different approaches rather than ruling out cate-
gories of acts based on criteria like transparency. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, The 
Law, Economics, and Psychology of Manipulation (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor 
Inst. for Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 726, 2015), http://ssrn.com/ ab-
stract=2617481 (arguing that welfarist criteria should be used to assess ma-
nipulative acts undertaken by government in pursuit of public ends).  
 205. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text.  
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been, uncovered through experimental work.206 If understand-
ings of fairness did not exhibit any regularities, and instead 
represented random and highly idiosyncratic reactions to dif-
ferent situational features, then it would not be possible to say 
anything predictive about how fairness perceptions would im-
pact relative political action costs in different contexts.207 As it 
is, fairness research provides reason to believe that redistribu-
tion (including cross-subsidies) embedded in legal rules outside 
of the tax-and-transfer system—that is, redistribution that 
does not advertise itself as such but instead operates within 
rubrics like the granting of entitlements or the correction of 
injustice—will be easier to carry out and harder to counter-
mand. Those interested in Collaboration will at least want to 
investigate this prediction.  
Similarly, cognitive features and biases, as well as deter-
minants of tax salience, operate in predictable ways. Other 
regularities might be uncovered surrounding the operation of 
legislative inertia in response to different types, sources, or 
magnitudes of distributive changes. Welfarists should be inter-
ested in all of these lines of inquiry. By understanding such 
components of political action costs, it may become possible to 
formulate policies that can achieve more redistribution, or that 
can achieve the same amount of redistribution more cheaply.  
2. Assessing Outputs 
Attending to political action costs can also change the way 
existing law, policies, and institutions are assessed. The princi-
ple of tax superiority is so well accepted that it sometimes per-
meates positive political analysis. For example, in a conversa-
tion with legal colleagues, the positive question was posed: 
given that peak-load or congestion pricing is efficient, why don’t 
we see more of such pricing of road use in the center of major 
cities, as we observe in London? One of us speculated as fol-
lows: because the poor, and those concerned with the welfare of 
the poor, oppose the distributional effects of charging the poor 
to use the roads. Given the K&S claim, the retort was obvious: 
The efficiency gains from congestion pricing of road use could 
                                                                                       
 206. See supra Part II.D.  
 207. An analogous point has been made in the context of behavioral law 
and economics. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 26, at 1654 (explaining that behav-
ioral law and economics “shares with [law and economics] the view that hu-
man behavior is organized by predictable patterns, which enable the analyst 
to generate models (often formal ones) and testable hypotheses about the ef-
fects of legal rules”).  
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be allocated to make the change distributionally neutral or 
even pro-poor, so the distributional effects cannot explain the 
policy’s failure.208 
Thus, the normative claim of tax superiority seems to sup-
port a claim of positive political theory: Because the ideal social 
planner can always improve the condition of the poor by (non-
tax) legal rules that ignore distribution, one cannot explain the 
existence of inefficient legal rules by a political concern for the 
poor.209 If one observes inefficient legal rules, then, there must 
be some other explanation apart from concern for distribu-
tion—presumably some political malfunction. Yet this line of 
analysis erroneously assumes invariance. Given varying politi-
cal action costs, one plausible explanation for the existence of 
inefficient rules, to be explored with other plausible public 
choice theories, is that the inefficiency makes politically feasi-
ble more welfare-enhancing distribution than would otherwise 
be possible.210  
Our discussion raises other areas for inquiry as well. Recall 
our previous distinction between “corrective invariance” and 
“aspirational invariance.” It is possible that adjustments in one 
direction or the other are more likely in Congress. For example, 
if redistribution in favor of the poor is understood to be more 
tightly capped by a political ceiling rather than supported by a 
political floor (or vice versa), then changes that make things 
worse (better) for the poor might escape correction to a greater 
extent than changes that make things better (worse) for the 
poor. The question merits empirical study. If corrective vari-
ance is much more significant than aspirational variance, for 
example, then it might be possible for courts to play a crucial 
role in distributive matters without ever undertaking to “redis-
tribute” from the existing baseline. 
                                                                                       
 208. For discussion of distributive and political economy issues surround-
ing congestion pricing, see Jonathan Remy Nash, Efficiency Versus Public 
Choice: The Case of Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. 
REV. 673, 725–38 (2008). 
 209. This example shows how the principle of formal tax superiority (we 
could in theory do better by pursuing this distributive goal through tax) often 
blurs not only into prescriptive tax superiority but also a positive prediction 
that institutional actors will behave in accordance with that prescription.  
 210. See Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots 
and the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 354 (2013) (suggesting that 
economists miss the positive political explanations of the differential use of 
carrots and sticks, which depend on their distributional effects, because of the 
normative belief that taxes alone should determine distribution). 
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3. Pursuing Invariance? 
As emphasized above, the prescriptive advice to ignore dis-
tributive considerations in formulating legal rules must be 
carefully distinguished from K&S’s formal result.211 That for-
mal result demonstrates the theoretical superiority of the tax-
and-transfer method for accomplishing a given quantum of re-
distribution, due to its being less distortionary. The empirical 
falsity of invariance, which goes to the political cost and hence 
feasibility of achieving particular redistributive goals through 
tax-and-transfer, does not undermine this claim of formal tax 
superiority. On the contrary, it raises the interesting question 
of how we might (and whether we should) shift more actual re-
distribution to the tax-and-transfer system.212 Put a little dif-
ferently, if we could do more to make invariance true, should 
we?  
The answer for a welfarist would turn, of course, on wheth-
er welfare would thereby be advanced. But the problem is com-
plicated by heterogeneity in redistributive preferences among 
various actors, who may subscribe to different social welfare 
functions that weight distribution very differently. Consider 
two different ways that invariance could be advanced as a posi-
tive matter. First, agencies, courts, and legislative bodies at all 
levels of government could be required to estimate the distribu-
tive impacts of their every act and report this to Congress, to 
facilitate distributive offsetting through the tax system,213 and 
Congress could adopt the practice of offsetting the net effect of 
these changes annually.214 Second, agencies, courts, and legis-
lative bodies at all levels of government could condition their 
own forbearance in using their redistributive powers on Con-
gress undertaking certain redistributive acts.215  
                                                                                       
 211. See supra Part I.A. 
 212. This point is tightly connected to the notion of a “political Coase Theo-
rem.” See supra note 174.  
 213. Agencies are already asked to include “distributional effects” in their 
regulatory impact analyses. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AF-
FAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 7–8 (2011), http://www 
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory 
-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf. 
 214. An alternative would be for Congress to key its tax responses to 
changes in an objective benchmark, such as the Gini coefficient. See ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER 149–64 (2003) (discussing the possibility 
of conditioning tax rates on achievement of certain measures of after-tax in-
come equality, to provide a form of societal “inequality insurance”). 
 215. Cf. Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), 
vacated as moot, 505 F.3d 1006 (2007) (enjoining enforcement of ordinance 
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Both approaches would be aimed at ensuring that whatev-
er redistribution does occur (from a baseline of efficiency), oc-
curs through tax and transfer. This would carry some welfare 
gains in reducing the behavioral distortions from redistributive 
legal rules, assuming for present purposes that K&S are correct 
in their extra distortion argument. But in the first case the dis-
tributive preferences of Congress would trump, while in the 
second the distributive preferences of the other bodies would 
trump. Variance is removed by allowing one distributive result 
to dominate; whether this advances or reduces welfare depends 
on one’s social welfare function. 
This thought experiment—making invariance true—brings 
us full circle. A redistributive mechanism’s relative merits as a 
redistributive mechanism cannot be evaluated independent of 
the distribution that it will be used to carry out. Efforts to 
channel all redistribution into the least distortionary mecha-
nism (whether by institutional reform or academic argument) 
cannot be supported solely by reference to it being the least dis-
tortionary mechanism. The invariance hypothesis tells us we 
can do no better in distributive terms elsewhere because, in 
effect, there is no elsewhere. Once we recognize that political 
action costs drive a wedge between the distributive results that 
other actors and bodies can achieve and the distributive prefer-
ences Congress instantiates through its tax and transfer policy, 
though, we cannot avoid the difficult normative questions about 
which distributive preferences—and whose—should take prec-
edence.  
  CONCLUSION   
If transaction costs were zero, we could select legal rules 
based solely on their welfare-advancing distributive properties 
and still reach an efficient outcome in every instance. Transac-
tion costs, then, explain the insistence on efficient rules that 
drives the principle of tax superiority. But prescriptive tax su-
periority also depends on an assumption about another imped-
iment to welfare maximization: that the political action costs 
necessary to achieve a desired distributive effect will never be 
larger for taxes than they are for doctrinal rules. This assump-
tion, in turn, underpins the invariance hypothesis that we have 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
against sitting, lying, or sleeping in public streets or sidewalks unless enough 
shelter beds are provided); supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing 
“trade adjustment assistance” programs that compensate those who lose out 
from free trade agreements). 
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criticized here. In fact, the costs of redistribution can vary 
across redistributive contexts in ways that make some distribu-
tive patterns impossible to achieve and maintain through tax 
alone. This distributive variance carries profound implications 
for the pursuit of social welfare, ones that welfarists should be 
interested in tracing.  
Clearing away the assumption of distributive invariance 
upon which the principle of prescriptive tax superiority is 
founded opens up new avenues of research for law and econom-
ics scholars. In addition to providing a reason why distributive 
goals might at times be better pursued through legal rules than 
through tax mechanisms, our analysis invites inquiry into the 
factors that influence the magnitude and operation of political 
action costs. Incorporating these elements into the analysis is 
admittedly messy; it upends the tidy division of labor that  
the invariance hypothesis supports.216 But as Nobel Laureate 
James Heckman has recognized, law and economics is “analyti-
cally incomplete” without “a satisfactory framework within 
which to analyze redistribution.”217 In his words, “A fully satis-
factory analysis would require a careful accounting of the poli-
tics of redistribution and the gap between ideal policies and 
those that are actually used by governments as they emerge 
from political compromises.”218 We agree.  
 
 
                                                                                       
 216. Cf. COASE, supra note 2, at 15 (“The world of zero transaction costs, to 
which the Coase Theorem applies, is the world of modern economic analysis, 
and economists therefore feel quite comfortable handling the intellectual prob-
lems it poses, remote from the real world though they may be.”). 
 217. Heckman, supra note 59, at 332. 
 218. Id. 
